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THE CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDING OF

ADJUDICATION: A Fuller(ian) Explanation for
the Supreme Court's Mass Tort

Jurisprudence
Donald G. Gifford
ABSTRACT

In this Article, I. argue that the Supreme Court is implicitly piecing
together a constitutionally mandated model of bounded adjudication
governing mass torts, using decisions that facially rest on disparate
constitutional provisions. This model constitutionally restricts common law
courts from adjudicating the rights, liabilities, and interests of persons who
are neither present before the court nor capable of being defined with a
reasonable degree of specificity. I find evidence for this model in the
Court's separate decisions rejecting tort-based climate change claims,
global settlements of massive asbestos litigation, and punitive damages
awards justified as extra-compensatory damages. These new forms of tort
litigation echoed the public law models of Abram Chayes and Owen Fiss
that, a generation ago, described public interest litigation in areas such as
civil rights. In rejecting public law tort litigation, the Court constitutionally
imposes a more traditional model of adjudication-a model advocated by
mid-twentieth century legal philosopher Lon Fuller but regarded as archaic
by most contemporary scholars. I then evaluate the Court's model on the
basis of factors including the limits of judicial competence, the need to
legitimize the judicial role in a democracy, and the related impact of
constitutional separation of powers. I weigh these factors against arguments
that unbounded adjudication is necessary both to compensate mass torts
victims who otherwise would be denied recovery and to regulate corporate
misconduct in the face of regulatory dysfunction. I conclude that a
presumptive model of bounded adjudication would restrain unprincipled
adjudication without imposing an institutional straightjacket.
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDING OF

ADJUDICATION: A Fuller(ian) Explanation for
the Supreme Court's Mass Tort

Jurisprudence
Donald G. Gifford*
INTRODUCTION

The Justices' skepticism was evident throughout the oral arguments in
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,' which marked the first time
the Supreme Court had considered a common law tort action against
businesses contributing to global climate change. Chief Justice Roberts
suggested that because "everyone is harmed by global warming," if the case
were allowed to proceed, "every individual in the world" could sue.2
Similarly, Justice Kagan asked counsel whether the six states and other
plaintiffs had a cause of action "against anybody in the world."3 Not
surprisingly, the Court unanimously held in favor of the defendants and in
the process noted that "considerations of scale and complexity distinguish
global warming from the more bounded pollution giving rise to past federal
nuisance suits."4
The Court's holding in American Electric Power Co. rests on the
relatively obscure doctrine of displacement of federal common law.5 More
than a decade earlier, the Court struck down global class action settlements
that would have determined the rights of "untold numbers of individuals"6
who were not yet even experiencing the effects of asbestos-related diseases
*
Edward M. Robertson Research Professor of Law, University of Maryland Carey
School of Law. J.D., Harvard University. I am grateful to Richard Boldt, Danielle Citron, Bob

Condlin, Oscar Gray, Deborah Hellman, Leslie Henry, Bill Reynolds, Robert Rhee, Bill
Richman, Jana Singer, Maxwell Stearns, David Super, and Greg Young for reviewing earlier
versions of this Article and offering valuable suggestions. I also thank Kathryn Daughtry,
Lauren Gold, Jhanelle Graham, Joseph Kroart, Ber-An Pan and Rebecca Young for their
research and editorial assistance.
1.
131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). Transcript of Oral Argument available at http://www.supreme
court.gov/oralarguments/argument-transcripts/I0-I74.pdf.
2.
Id. at 57-58.
3.
Id. at51.
4.
Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S.Ct. 2527, 2536 (2011) (emphasis added).
5.
Id. at 2537.
6.
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 602 (1997).
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in two opinions that rely nominally on the class action certification
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but are suffused with
due process concerns. More recently, the Court reversed a $79.5 million
punitive damages award against a tobacco manufacturer on due process
grounds because the trial court invited the jury to punish the defendant for

harming an indeterminate number of unidentified "persons who [were] not
before the court ... ."8 Meanwhile, lower federal courts have dismissed
climate change tort actions similar to American Electric Power Co. on
justiciability grounds-namely standing and the political question
doctrine 9 because of their concerns about the unbounded, diffuse, and
generalized nature of the harm.' °
These decisions rely on a variety of constitutional and doctrinal grounds.
On the surface, no obvious constitutional basis appears to undergird the
results. One possible explanation is that the Supreme Court and lower
federal courts are picking and choosing from a grab bag of sometimesobscure constitutional doctrines to accomplish their pro-business purposes.
In a 2010 study, Lee Epstein, William Landes, and Richard Posner found

the Roberts Court to be decidedly more pro-business than its predecessors. 1
However, the fact that Justice Ginsburg, probably the most liberal member
of the Court, wrote for a unanimous Court in American Electric Power Co.
casts doubt on this assertion. In this Article, I suggest another more
principled and more fundamental alternative explanation: the Supreme

7.
See infra notes 158-68 and accompanying text.
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007); see infra notes 169-86 and
8.
accompanying text.
9.
Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 883 (N.D. Cal.
public nuisance case on standing and political question grounds); California
(dismissing
2009)
v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *48 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 17, 2007) (dismissing federal common law nuisance claim on political question grounds);
see also Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 598 F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 2010) (vacating decision of
three-judge panel that reversed the lower court's dismissal for lack of standing and presentation
of a nonjusticiable political question), vacating 585 F.3d 855, 860 n.2, 879-80 (5th Cir. 2009).
10. ExxonMobil, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 880-81; Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
68547, at *47-48.
11. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Is the Roberts Court Proat
available
manuscript),
2010)
(unpublished
17,
1-3
(Dec.
Business?
http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/RobertsBusiness.pdf. According to the authors, the
Roberts Court reached a decision that they characterized as anti-business in only 39 percent of
all "economic activity" cases (largely non-tort cases), compared with 58 percent of decisions
from all previous Court terms from 1953 until 2005. Id. at 2. The Roberts Court also granted
certiorari in a larger fraction of economic activity cases than previous courts. Id. at 3.
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new "unified theory"' 3 of constitutional

boundaries in mass tort litigation. I deliberately use the word "slouching"

because the Supreme Court's movement does not appear to have the
development of a unified doctrine as its stated goal.
This Article is the first to argue that when the Court dismisses cuttingedge mass tort claims, wittingly or not, it constitutionalizes a particular
conception of common law adjudication, which I call the model of bounded
14
adjudication.
The Court's emerging view is that the Constitution limits

common law tort adjudication to those cases between individual parties or
well-defined and carefully-circumscribed groups. Under this new model, it
is constitutionally inappropriate for a common law court to adjudicate the
rights, liabilities, and interests of persons who either have not yet been
harmed or who cannot be identified or described with a reasonable degree
of specificity at the time of the adjudication. The Court draws a sharp
contrast between legislation-in which popularly elected assemblies create
generalized rights and responsibilities-and common law adjudication that
establishes the respective rights and liabilities of only the parties present in
the litigation.15 Thus, any judicial attempt to address plaintiffs' allegations
of generalized or diffuse harms violates the Constitution. My concern is not
with routine class action practice, even though the Supreme Court and other
federal courts have largely nixed the use of class actions seeking
compensation for tort damages. 6 Instead, I address a critically important,
but narrower subcategory of collective tort litigation-unbounded
adjudication.
12.

William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming, in THE NEW OXFORD BOOK OF ENGLISH
1250-1950, at 820-21 (Helen Gardner ed., 1972) ("And what rough beast, its hour come
round at last, Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?").
13. STEPHEN HAWKING & LEONARD MLODINOW, A BRIEFER HISTORY OF TIME 16-17
(2005) (describing efforts to unify quantum mechanics and the general theory of relativity, just
as the Supreme Court is unifying disparate doctrines related to a constitutional requirement of
bounded adjudication).
14. See infra notes 87-89, 135-39 and accompanying text.
15. Cf. RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 235 (2007)
(comparing the distinction between adjudication and legislation with differences between
administrative rulemaking and adjudication and stating that "[a]ffected persons are entitled as a
matter of constitutional due process to an individualized 'opportunity to be heard' in
adjudication but not in rulemaking").
16. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864-65 (1999) (rejecting attempt to
certify class of future victims of asbestos-related diseases under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)); Amchem
Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 641 (1997) (reversing certification of class consisting of
both current asbestos victims and those as yet asymptomatic); Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc.,
97 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 1996) (denying class certification in case against manufacturer of
epilepsy drug); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995) (denying
class certification of hemophiliacs whose blood transfusions were contaminated with HIV).
VERSE

HeinOnline -- 44 Ariz. St. L.J. 1112 2012

44:1 109]

CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDING

1113

If my interpretation is correct, the Supreme Court's nascent
constitutional architecture for mass torts signals an end to many new forms
of cutting-edge mass tort litigation that have emerged during the past two
decades. The Court's jurisprudence has already functionally eliminated
global settlements of class actions, 7 upset what had been the most widely
shared scholarly conception of the role of punitive damages," 8 and probably
rendered global climate change tort litigation impossible.1 9 In addition, the
Court's emerging model of bounded adjudication contrasts sharply with the
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation'20 recently adopted by the
American Law Institute (ALI). Despite the Court's consistently strong
commitment to the due process rights of notice and the opportunity for all
affected individuals to participate in an adjudication, the ALI concludes that
21
such efforts, at least in the most literal sense, are "doomed.,
This new genre of public law tort litigation is an offshoot of more firmly
established public interest litigation seeking enforcement of constitutional
and federal statutory rights and involving issues such as civil rights, the
environment, and institutional reform of school systems, prisons, and state
psychiatric hospitals. It is only within the past fifteen years or so that the
public law model began to inspire innovative forms of mass torts, resting on
the common law, that seek judicially imposed-but explicit and
comprehensive-regulation of the conduct of private actors, usually
corporations. 12
The Supreme Court's dismantling of public interest tort actions parallels
its reining in of more traditional public interest litigation. Judith Resnik
recently described three decisions from the 2010 term23 that restricted
judicial access rights for "consumers, employees, and parents"24 who had
gained entitlements under statutes enacted as a result of the "social and
17.
18.
19.

See infra notes 158-68 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 238-53 and accompanying text.

20.

AMERICAN

LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE

LITIGATION

(2010).
21. Id.at 1.
22. See infra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
23. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751-52 (20l1) (holding that
state statute invalidating contract provisions precluding class arbitration was preempted by the
Federal Arbitration Act); Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (concluding that an indigent
father facing incarceration in civil contempt proceeding for failure to pay child support is not
necessarily entitled to appointment of counsel, but finding a due process violation under the
facts of the case); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011) (denying class
certification for 1.5 million female employees of Wal-Mart in action alleging discrimination in
violation of Title VII).
24. Judith Resnik, Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion,
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 169 (2011).
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political movements of twentieth-century America' 25 and under
constitutional provisions newly infused with "commitments to equality and
• ..dignity." 6 Two of the three decisions analyzed by Resnik constricted

class action litigation,27 holdings closely related to the more general issue of
a court's authority to bind parties not participating directly in the
adjudication.
Normatively, however, the propriety of the Court's restrictions on
enforcement of constitutional and statutory provisions and the legitimacy of
the Court's limitations on the more avant-garde public tort litigation do not
necessarily rise and fall together. Public tort litigation poses risks to both
the accuracy of adjudication and the role of the judiciary in a democratic
society that more traditional forms of public interest litigation do not. Trial
and appellate court judges, particularly those feeling comparatively less
constrained by traditional notions of the limits of judicial law-making
power-who are often derisively referred to by many in the business
community as "activist judges"-possess enormous discretion under the
common law to reinterpret precedents in an expansive manner enabling
them to extend adjudication to directly affect nonparties. In contrast,
adjudication of rights granted by statutes rests on the usually comparatively
determinate wording adopted by Congress or state legislatures. Even when
statutory language is conducive to expansive interpretations, the statute
itself, unlike the common law, reflects past decisions of a politically
accountable Congress or state legislature. Admittedly, the words and
meaning of constitutional provisions sometimes are quite vague, but within
a constitutional system of governance, they presumably reflect a higher
order of authority and legitimacy than does judicially-authored common
9
law.

2

25. Id. at 168.
26. Id. at 169.
27. AT&TMobility, L.L.C., 131 S. Ct. at 1740; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2541.
28. Consider the trial court judge in the State of Rhode Island's litigation against lead
pigment manufacturers. State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n., 951 A.2d 428, 435 (R.I. 2008). The judge
knew that thousands of mostly poor children in his state suffered from childhood lead poisoning
and that the state government lacked the resources or the political will to effectively eliminate
the problem. See DONALD G. GIFFORD, SUING THE TOBACCO AND LEAD PIGMENT INDUSTRIES:
GOVERNMENT LITIGATION AS PUBLIC HEALTH PRESCRIPTION

141-42 (2010). The State's

strongest claim rested on public nuisance, perhaps the most indeterminate of all common law
torts. Id.at 88, 144-48. The trial court's expansive interpretation of the tort, later reversed on
appeal, Lead Indus. Ass'n., 951 A.2d at 435, would have dramatically affected the rights of
thousands of property owners who were not parties to the litigation. GIFFORD, supra, at 154-55.
29. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (describing the Constitution as
"superior, paramount law"); 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6-7 (1991)
(reasoning that the Constitution represents "higher lawmaking" in the legal system).
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Contemporaneously with the earlier waves of traditional public interest
litigation, Abram Chayes and Owen Fiss described the phenomena as
examples of a newly emerging "public law model" of litigation, in which
reform-minded plaintiffs asserted constitutional and statutory rights in
efforts designed to regulate government defendants." The Supreme Court's
nascent constitutional architecture of bounded adjudication rejects the
application of Chayes's and Fiss's public law model to mass torts. Instead,
the Court's emerging jurisprudence echoes the limits of adjudication
espoused by legal philosopher Lon L. Fuller a half-century ago, a concept
of adjudication that Chayes and Fiss rejected as archaic even when they
wrote during the 1970s.31
The normative questions remain: Does the Supreme Court's response to
contemporary mass tort litigation represent the Court's adoption of an
outmoded model for understanding adjudication, or even worse, an
unprincipled manifestation of the Court's pro-business bias? Or does the
Court's model reflect an understanding of the inherent limitations of
common law judicial authority in a constitutional democracy when courts
encounter these new forms of avant-garde litigation?
In this Article, I assess three factors that arguably justify the Supreme
Court's constitutional bounding of mass torts: (1) the limits of judicial
competency and the need for accuracy in adjudication,3" (2) the participation
of individuals affected by the adjudication as a means of legitimizing the
judge's powerful role in a democratic society,33 and (3) the related impact of
constitutional separation of powers.3 4 I weigh these factors against two
arguments suggesting that unbounded mass tort litigation is necessary
notwithstanding constitutional tensions. First, without the unbounded
collectivization of mass torts involving widespread latent diseases, such as
tobacco-related diseases or childhood lead poisoning, victims harmed by
tortfeasors' conduct often lack any remedy whatsoever.3 5 Second, given the
frequently dysfunctional state of our political processes and the serious
threat posed by global climate change and other mass harms, public law tort
litigation sometimes affords the only realistic means of preventing

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See
See
See
See
See
See

infra notes 90-105 and accompanying text.
infra notes 67-89 and accompanying text.
infra notes 260-78 and accompanying text.
infra notes 279-90 and accompanying text.
infra notes 291-307 and accompanying text.
infra notes 308-21 and accompanying text.
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potentially catastrophic consequences.3 6 In other words, as the late Justice
Tom Clark once wrote, "the Constitution is not a suicide pact ....37
Part 138 of the Article begins by describing the contours of the model of
bounded adjudication that emerge from the writings of Fuller.39 I then
contrast this model with the public law models of Chayes and Fiss.4 °
Finally, I describe the emergence during the past generation of the new

genre of public law tort litigation that more closely resembles the public
interest reform litigation described by Chayes and Fiss than it does
traditional tort litigation. 4'
42
In Part II,
I assert that when the Supreme Court has encountered mass
tort actions, it has constitutionally mandated a model of bounded
adjudication at odds with the public law model. I trace the Supreme Court's
implicit adoption of this bounded adjudication model through a
constellation of cases resting on separate and distinct doctrinal grounds.

Part II143 provides a normative assessment of the Court's constitutionally
imposed model of bounded adjudication. I then briefly conclude.44
I.

UNBOUNDED LITIGATION

Today's typical tort victim looks remarkably similar to her counterpart
fifty years ago-someone injured in an auto accident or in a slip-and-fall
incident at the local grocery store. 45 The victim sues one or two tortfeasors
who acted wrongfully and contributed to her injury. The result of the
adjudication does not directly impact anyone else-that is, nonparties-and
the extent of the defendant's liability does not depend upon harms he might
have caused nonparties. The adjudication is bounded and circumscribed.
36. See infra notes 323-33 and accompanying text.
37. Tom Clark, The First Amendment and Minority Rights, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 257, 260
(1969); cf Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J.,dissenting)
("There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical
wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.").
38. See infra notes 45-134 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 61-89 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 90-113 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 114-34 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 135-253 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 254-334 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 335-44 and accompanying text.
45. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE
UNITED STATES: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 20-21 (1991) (stating that the "typical injury incident"
is a "minor injury"); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the
Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1192 (1992) (noting that
"cases of the auto negligence and slip-and-fall variety" are more frequent than "torts of mass
destruction").
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Of course, tort theorists subscribing to law and economics and other
instrumental conceptions of tort law view all tort law as a form of public

law. As early as 1959, Leon Green famously characterized tort law as
"public law in disguise" because of the importance of its societal impact on
others "outside and beyond the interests of the immediate parties to the
litigation., 46 To the extent that tort judgments deter others from engaging in
harmful conduct 47 and distribute losses resulting from accidents in a manner
that alleviates societal costs,48 individual tort judgments obviously affect
nonparties, but only indirectly. In contrast to law and economic scholars,
other tort scholars, notably those representing the civil recourse 49 and
corrective justice' ° perspectives, reject "public law in disguise" as the most
accurate characterization of tort law. They focus instead on the relationship
between the victim and the wrongdoer, not implementing society-wide
instrumental goals that may affect the interests of nonparties.
In any event, it is against the backdrop of traditional common law
actions that Professor Lon L. Fuller of Harvard developed his well known
theory of adjudication, a model described below in Section A.51 For
purposes of this Article, one aspect of Fuller's model is most pertinent: his
contention that the explicit and direct effects of the court's remedy in an
adjudication should be limited to the parties before the court.52 In other

46. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1959).
47. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
68 (1970) (asserting the need to discourage activities likely to be harmful and to encourage
"safer ways of engaging in the same activities"); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 315-48 (8th ed. 2011) (identifying punishment for tortious conduct as socially and
economically efficient); Richard A. Posner, A Theory ofNegligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972)
(arguing that punishment in a system of fault-based liability serves as a deterrent to potential
tortfeasors).
48. CALABRESI, supra note 47, at 27-28.
49. See John C.P. Goldberg, The ConstitutionalStatus of Tort Law: Due Process and the
Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 599 (2005) (concluding that tort
law "empowers a victim to seek redress from a wrongdoer because [the wrongdoer] has acted
wrongfully toward him (or persons such as him)-not merely because the actor acted in a
sufficiently antisocial manner for government officials to be justified in sanctioning him");
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 744, 746
(2003) (viewing torts as relational wrongs where "one has a right of action in tort only against a
person who has wronged one").
50. See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 1, 142-44 (1995) ("The most
striking feature of private law is that it directly connects two particular parties through the
phenomenon of liability."); Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403, 409
(1992) (identifying "the basic feature of private law" to be that "a particular plaintiff sues a
particular defendant").
51. See infra notes 67-89 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
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words, courts should not explicitly engage in comprehensive regulation that
directly affects nonparties.
Fuller's model of traditional adjudication appeared antiquated by the
mid-1970s, when civil rights and other institutional reform litigation
flooded the federal courts. In this then-novel litigation environment, Abram
Chayes of Harvard espoused a competing, more reform-litigation-friendly
"public law model."53 Soon thereafter, Owen Fiss of Yale advanced his own
"structural reform" model, a model distinct' from that of Chayes, but
generally complementary to it. Because of the similarities of these models, I
sometimes refer to them both as "public law models." These models
contrast sharply with that of Fuller. For example, Chayes views
adjudication not as "a dispute between private individuals about private
rights, but a grievance about the operation of public policy."54 Fiss refers to
Fuller's model as a "dispute resolution model" of adjudication55 while
Chayes equates it with "traditional" adjudication.56 I briefly describe
Chayes's and Fiss's models in Part B below.57
Chayes and Fiss wrote against a background of large-scale public interest
litigation. The common law tort adjudication of their day was not what they
had in mind. Their public law and structural reform models focused on legal
challenges to government wrongdoing; today's public law tort ligation
challenges corporate wrongdoing.58 Constitutional provisions undergirded
the earlier genre of litigation-its younger sibling rests, sometimes uneasily,
on the judge-made common law of torts. In many public law tort actions,
the objectives are to tackle large social problems caused by private
corporations, such as global warming or childhood lead poisoning, and to
replace the regulation of corporate conduct by the politically accountable
branches, perceived to be inadequate, with judicially imposed
53. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1284 (1976).
54. Id. at 1302.
55. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 39 (1979);
Chayes, supra note 53, at 1282.
56. Chayes, supra note 53, at 1282; Fiss, supra note 55, at 37; Robert G. Bone, Lon
Fuller's Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and
Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1273, 1279 (1995). Bone argues that these
characterizations are "caricature[s]," and that Fuller appreciated "the creative, moral dimension
to adjudication." Id. at 1275, 1323.
57. See infra notes 90-107 and accompanying text.
58. Chayes, supra note 53, at 1284; see also Fiss, supra note 55, at 41 (discussing the
importance of public-interest litigation in "[t]he reconstruction of a prison, . . . a school system,
...a hospital, or any bureaucracy"). Sixteen years later, Chayes expanded his public law model
to include actions designed to change corporate policies. Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court,
1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 28
(1982).
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comprehensive regulatory regimes.5 9 In Section C,60 I describe public law
tort litigation.

A.

Fuller and his Principlesof BoundedAdjudication

By the 1930s, legal realists had obliterated the notion that the law was a
neutral, apolitical science.6" However, the rise of Nazism and Stalinism
increased the need for legal scholars to justify the exercise of judicial power
within a democracy on the basis of something other than ideology or results
alone.62 With its origins in the work of scholars during the 1930s and
1940s,6 3 the "legal process school" emerged during the 1950s as a means to
re-create the idea of principled adjudication by establishing process
standards of "[r]easoned [e]laboration. ' 64 The model suggested that certain
types of decisions should be made by the legislature, the political branch
that expresses the will of the electorate.65 Other decisions would be made by
the judicial branch, where judges were often not elected. The courts'

decision-making should be subject to procedures designed to assure selfrestraint and objectivity of process.6 6
Fuller emerged as a leading theorist of the legal process movement that
"dominated the academy during the 1950s and 1960s and that influenced

59. See infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 115-34 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., JEROME N. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 108-16 (1930) (arguing
that judges work backwards from results to reasoning); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About
Realism: Responding to Dean Pound,44 HARV. L. REv. 1222, 1222 (1931) ("Behind decisions
stand judges . . . they have human backgrounds. Beyond rules, again, lie effects: beyond
decisions stand people whom rules and decisions directly or indirectly touch.").
62. Cf EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC
NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 5 (1973) ("[T]he frightening rise of European
totalitarianism, especially Nazism, directly challenged both the political security and theoretical
validity of democracy.").
63. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical
Introduction to The Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (1958).
64. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 253-68 (1992) (asserting that the "single dominant theme in
post-war American academic legal thought is the effort to find a 'morality of process'
independent of results"); G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration:
JurisprudentialCriticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REv. 279, 279 (1973) (noting that
"Reasoned Elaboration" emerged in the 1930s and 1940s as a result of "academic hostility to
jurisprudential Realism").
65. HART & SACKS, supra note 63, at 696-97.
66. Id. at 568-69.
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several generations of judges and lawyers." 67 His article, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication,68 is regarded as one of the three "central works of..
[the] legal process tradition."69 Excerpts from the article are included in
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks's once iconic teaching materials, The Legal
Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law.70 By the
1970s, though, critics attacked the legal process school for its sunny, 1950s

assessment of the role of law as a means to expand common welfare via
value-neutral principles.71 Indeed, William Eskridge and Philip Frickey tell
of one faculty member who supposedly roamed the halls of the Harvard
Law School during Sacks's tenure as dean in the 1970s, uttering: "Legal

process is dead., 72 However, based on their survey of the impact of Hart
and Sacks's The Legal Process on legal scholars and the Supreme Court,
Eskridge and Frickey conclude that the materials experienced "an unusually
successful afterlife. 73
In The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,74 Fuller wrote that
"[a]djudication is . . . a device which gives formal and institutional
expression to the influence of reasoned argument in human affairs., 75 Each
party makes a claim of right 76 based upon a rule, principle, or standard that
predated the adjudication.77 A core characteristic of adjudication is the
ability of an affected party to participate through the presentation of proof
67. Bone, supra note 56, at 1276. Fuller is perhaps better known to the modem audience
for his debate with H.L.A. Hart concerning the relationship between law and morality. E.g.,
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separationof Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593 (1958)
(debating the existence of a distinction between law and morality); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism
and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to ProfessorHart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958).
68. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms andLimits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
69. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 63, at cii.
70. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. Eskridge and Frickey report that once
Fuller arrived as a faculty member at Harvard in 1940, he "joined Hart in a mutual admiration
society . . . and [t]he two scholars openly acknowledged their debt to one another.
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 63, at lxxxiii.
71. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685 (1976) (stating that "substantive ... conflict in private law cannot be
reduced to disagreement about how to apply some neutral calculus that will 'maximize the total
satisfaction of valid human wants."' (quoting HART & SACKS, supra note 63, at 113)).
72. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 63, at cxxv.
73. Id.
74. See Fuller, supra note 68.
75. Id. at 366; cf John Rawls, Outline of a Decision Procedurefor Ethics, 60 PHIL. REV.
177, 187 (1951) ("[A] judgment in a particular case is evidenced to be rational by showing that.
[it] is capable of being explicated by a justifiable principle.").
76. Fuller, supra note 68, at 365.
77. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication (1957) (unpublished earlier
version of manuscript, reproduced in HART & SACKS, supra note 63, at 399). Fuller further
explains that in adjudication, "like cases" must receive "like treatment." Id.
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and reasoned arguments." Elsewhere, Fuller explained that judges work
"within a particular institutional framework"79 and "that there are certain

kinds of social tasks that are not suitable raw material for the adjudicative
process."' He warned that when these principles are ignored, society
"suffers from too much government by judges."8 1

In Fuller's view, common law courts are inescapably unsuited for
managing enterprises and institutions. 2 He warned that in complex
activities in which "every part is in interaction with the whole; to obtain

through adjudicative procedures all the information necessary for economic
direction would overfill the hearing chamber with 'litigants,' each with a
different, segmental story of the relevance of a contemplated decision to his
fractional participation in the whole undertaking."8 3 Fuller also concluded
that polycentric issues, the sort of issues that lie at the heart of
contemporary tort cases such as climate change litigation, are inherently
beyond the limits of judicial competence.84 As an example, Fuller suggested
that it would be impossible for courts to establish wage and price controls

because "the forms of adjudication cannot encompass and take into account
the complex repercussions that may result from any change in prices or
wages."85 Fuller compared polycentric issues to "a spider web" in which "a
78. Fuller, supra note 68, at 365. Of course, Fuller continued, the opportunity for a
political candidate to make a speech to the electorate would also satisfy this criterion. What is
unique to adjudication is the fact that the participation in the decision "is institutionally defined
and assured." Id. at 366; see also Lon L. Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 54 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 1, 2, 5 (1960) (describing a party's right of participation as the "familiar
conception... of giving the affected party 'his day in court"').
79. Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, supra note 78, at 1; see also HART & SACKS,
supra note 63, at 643 (stating that questions submitted to courts must be ones capable of being
resolved through a judicial process); Fuller, supra note 68, at 353-409 (defining the "kinds of
social tasks" that courts are competent to handle).
80. Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule ofLaw, supra note 78, at 1.

81. LON L. FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE: A SELECTION OF READINGS
SUPPLEMENTED BY COMMENTS PREPARED BY THE EDITOR 716 (Temp. ed. 1949); see also HART
& SACKS, supra note 63, at 645 (arguing that modem democratic theory relegates "disputes
which are not susceptible of solution by reasoning from generally applicable criteria of
decision" to the legislature).
82. LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 110 (1968).
83. Id. at 1l.
84. Fuller, supra note 68, at 371. Hart and Sacks reach a similar conclusion:
Adjudication of disputes about managerial decisions involving the
selection of a course of action for the future from among many possible
courses is not ordinarily satisfactory, if it is feasible at all, because of the
numerous variables to be taken into account and the impossibility of
developing generally applicable premises of reasoning with reference to
which the variables can be judged.
HART & SACKS, supra note 63, at 647.
85. Fuller, supra note 68, at 394.
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pull on one strand will distribute
tensions after a complicated pattern
6
throughout the web as a whole.,1

For purposes of this Article, Fuller's most important insight regarding
the adjudication process undergirds what I refer to as the model of bounded
adjudication. Fuller recognized that courts are ill-equipped to engage in
comprehensive regulation that affects the interests of nonparties to the
litigation. This core principle of the model reflects Fuller's strong
commitment to the idea that it is the participation of the parties that both
informs the judge's decision and legitimizes his exercise of power within a
democratic society. As early as 1947, Fuller wrote that when judges attempt
to regulate beyond the specific problems experienced by the parties, they
''may not understand the interests that are affected by a decision rendered
outside that framework."" As with managerial decisions, the proofs and
arguments of the parties fail to adequately inform the court when there are
"considerations much more important than those contained in the
fragmentary presentation open to any single party."88 Fuller believed that
when a court fails to proceed in a piecemeal fashion and instead "undertakes
comprehensive regulation[,] it forfeits its distinctive force ...,,9

B.

The Public Law Models of Chayes and Fiss

Chayes's public law model of litigation contrasts sharply with the norm
envisioned by Fuller and is distinctly unbounded in nature. Chayes viewed
adjudication as "a grievance about the operation of public policy"9 and
asserted that a court's fact-finding is "legislative" in nature.91 Like Fuller,
Chayes identified the interests of nonparties who are affected by public law
litigation as at the core of his disagreement with Fuller about the nature of
adjudication.92 Chayes argued that the parties to an adjudication are "not
rigidly bilateral but sprawling and amorphous." 93 Further, the relief granted
by the court "often [has] important consequences for many persons
94
including absentees.1

Chayes acknowledged that it is an open question as to whether the judge
in public law litigation is capable of designing "a party structure that is
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 395.
FULLER, supra note 81, at 707.
Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule ofLaw, supra note 78, at 4.
FULLER, supra note 81, at 728.
Chayes, supra note 53, at 1302.
Id.
Chayes, supranote 58, at 5.
Chayes, supranote 53, at 1302.
Id.
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adequately representative in light of the consequences of public law
litigation without introducing so much complexity that the procedure falls
of its own weight."95 He also appreciated the trial court's difficulty in
weighing the interests of each of those affected by the litigation.9 6 Finally,
he admitted that Congress "is the institution authoritatively empowered in
our system to balance incommensurable political values and interests."9 7
Ultimately though, Chayes believed that these issues of judicial competence
and constitutional propriety were outweighed by the need for courts to step
in when the politically accountable branches of government fail.98
Three years later, Owen Fiss offered his own analysis of the same new
litigation that Chayes analyzed.9 9 According to Fiss, the critical aspect of
the high profile reform litigation during the 1960s and 1970s was that it
constituted "structural reform" ' of large-scale government institutions
such as schools or prison systems. In his view, the function of courts is not
to decide disputes, but rather to participate in the "social process by which
judges give meaning to our public values.""'' Fiss directly attacked Fuller's
conception of adjudication, characterizing it as being naive, because it grew
out of an "essentially harmonious" social order "rooted in a world that no
longer exists.' 0 2 He recognized the link between what he regarded as the
inherently polycentric nature of the courts' role in generating public norms
and the notion, mistaken in his view, that all affected parties should have an
opportunity to participate."' Such participation rights, in Fiss's view, would
make structural reform litigation unwieldy and, ultimately, infeasible. 0 4
When he observed that court-generated public norms usually affect many
groups of individuals,0 5 Fiss openly acknowledged the unbounded nature of
structural reform litigation.
0 6 when Chayes and
As previously noted,"
Fiss formulated their public
law models, they described litigation enforcing federal constitutional and

95. Id. at 1312.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1313. Ultimately, Chayes rested his hopes for addressing this concern on the
parties' ability to negotiate settlements. Id. at 1310.
98. Id. at 1312-13.
99. Fiss, supra note 55, at 35-36.
100. Id. at 2.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 18, 44.
103. Id.
104. Id. at44.
105. Id. at 2.
106. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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statutory rights, not common law tort litigation." 7 As early as 1984, David

Rosenberg argued that the public law model accurately described the thencurrent handling of asbestos cases and other mass products claims and
provided courts with an appropriate litigation structure to regulate private
corporations as well as public agencies.10 8 Linda Mullenix disagreed with
Rosenberg, contending that actions between "private parties alleging private
harms" could not be analogized to public law litigation designed to change
government policy.'0 9 As described below," 0 more recent mass tort
litigation cycles, such as those seeking to have judges comprehensively
regulate greenhouse gas emissions"' or solve society-wide problems such
as childhood lead poisoning, 12 reform government policy and fit
comfortably within the public law model." 3
C.

The Emergence of Unbounded Tort Litigation

The repeated and massive nature of harmful corporate acts and omissions
poses challenges to a tort system still operating under a very distinctive set
of fundamental common law principles designed by common law judges of
an earlier era. When courts first established these principles, they addressed
107. Chayes, supra note 53, at 1284, 1314-15 (describing the objective of public law
litigation as "the vindication of constitutional or statutory policies"); see also Fiss, supra note
55, at 29 (identifying constitutional litigation as "the most vivid manifestation" of his model).
108. David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 851, 905-24 (1984). Rosenberg saw the public law
model as a means to overcome an individual victim's inability to prove that the products of any
particular manufacturer caused her harm. Id. at 859; see also Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical
Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 469, 472-74 (1994) (noting similarities
between mass products torts cases and public law litigation).
109. Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law
Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REv. 413, 424-31 (1999); see also Linda S.
Mullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law Litigation: Paradigm Misplaced, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 579,
580-82 (1994) (asserting that mass tort litigations are not "public law litigation" because they
"do not involve constitutional rights, . .. do not pit . . . defenseless claimants against ... big,
impersonal government institution[s],... [and] there is no state action involved in any of these
cases").
110. See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
111. E.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (dismissing federal
common law nuisance claims brought by eight states against electric power corporations for
defendants' contributions to global warming).
112. E.g., State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 435 (R.I. 2008) (reversing judgment
for state, acting as parenspatriae,in action against former lead pigment manufacturers).
113. See Donald G. Gifford, Climate Change and the Public Law Model of Torts:
Reinvigorating Judicial Restraint Doctrines, 62 S.C. L. Rev. 201, 219-22 (2010) (suggesting
that "the latest genre of policy-making tort litigation fits comfortably within [the public law
model]").
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far different kinds of harms, such as the traumatic injuries that occurred
instantaneously to a single victim when a railroad locomotive or an
automobile smashed his body.114 However, in our mass production society,
when multinational corporations manufacture harmful products such as
asbestos insulation or cigarettes, they injure hundreds of thousands of
people, if not millions. Some of these people, at the time the litigation is
filed, are already experiencing injuries, but many others are not. 15
Similarly, in global warming, thousands of firms contribute to the problem
by emitting greenhouse gases.
Two recent developments in mass tort litigation largely explain why tort
actions are less tightly bounded than they once were. First, courts have
begun to view tortious harm collectively, instead of as a series of individual
harms." 6 This enables claimants to satisfy causation requirements when
they otherwise might not be able to. Second, public interest advocates and
mass plaintiffs' attorneys increasingly believe that the political process has
failed to effectively regulate corporate conduct resulting in widespread
harm-such as greenhouse gas emissions-and ask courts to impose
alternative regulatory schemes. 7 In these instances, the attorneys view the
harm as society-wide in scope, that is, unbounded.
1.

Collectivization of Mass Torts and Causation

Victims of mass corporate torts often cannot satisfy what William
Prosser described as "the simplest and most obvious"'' aspect of
determining tort liability: the requirement that a specific tortfeasor caused a
particular victim's harm. For example, the daughter of the woman who took
DES during her pregnancy to prevent miscarriages is unable to identify the
pharmaceutical manufacturer that produced the drug that causes her cancer
decades later." 9 In other instances, the actions of multiple tortfeasors
114. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 350 (3d ed. 2005)
(detailing the history of the common law system in the United States, including tort litigation).
115. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS
LITIGATION (2005) (reporting on both current and anticipated incidence of asbestos-related
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/
diseases),
available at
RAND MG162.pdf.
116. See infra notes 118-27 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
118. WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 237 (4th ed. 1971); see also
Payton v. Abbott Labs., 437 N.E.2d 171, 188 (Mass. 1982) (stating that "identification of the
party responsible for causing injury to another is a longstanding prerequisite" for liability).
119. E.g., Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 936-38 (Cal. 1980) (noting that if the
plaintiff in a DES case were required to identify the specific manufacturer who supplied her
mother with DES, she would "effectively be precluded from any recovery"); see also, e.g.,
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combine to cause a victim's harm, such as when several tobacco companies
manufactured cigarettes smoked by the recently diagnosed cancer victim
during her lifetime. In the global climate change litigation, literally billions
of people contribute to the emission of greenhouse gases by heating their
homes, driving their automobiles, and firing up their grills. As Justices
Scalia and Kagan suggested, 21 theoretically at least, they might all
legitimately be joined as defendants.
As a result, courts sometimes view harms to many individuals as a
collective harm in order to circumvent the traditional requirement that any
particular victim prove which, among many, tortfeasors specifically caused
his harm. Individual victims are represented before the court by a
"collective" plaintiff,121 such as a class action representative,

122

a state suing

12

as parens patriae, or a municipal or county government representing
some or all of its residents. 24 In these circumstances, the defendant's
liability extends beyond the harms suffered by the parties before the court
and includes harms to many nonparties allegedly harmed by its conduct,
including those as of yet unidentified and even unharmed. Often this is
accomplished by using a substantive claim, such as public nuisance, that
views the pervasive harms not as an aggregation
of individual harms, but
125
rather as collective harm to society as a whole.
Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1219, 1225 (Cal. 1997) (noting that plaintiffs
could not prevail if required to show that exposure to asbestos produced by any particular
manufacturer "increase[ed] the decedent's risk of developing lung cancer").
120. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
121. Donald G. Gifford, The Challenge to the Individual Causation Requirement in Mass
Products Torts, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 873, 892-900, 915-33 (2005).
122. E.g., Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1257 (Fla. 2006); Cimino v.
Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 652-53 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (describing class certification
in action against asbestos manufacturers), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir.
1998).
123. E.g., State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 434 (R.I. 2008) (describing action by
state, acting as parenspatriae, against former lead pigment manufacturers); In re Mike Moore
ex rel. State Tobacco Litig., Cause No. 94-1429, 2006 WL 3804253 (Miss. Ch. Ct. May 30,
2006) (describing parens patriae action against tobacco manufacturers for tobacco-related

diseases).
124. E.g., City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1147-48 (Ill. 2004)
(dismissing the city's action seeking compensation for expenditures caused by gun-related
violence); City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus. Inc., 691 N.W.2d 888, 890, 897 (Wis. Ct. App.
2004) (allowing the city's action against paint companies to proceed to trial).
125. See GIFFORD, supra note 28, at 144. Compare Lead Indus. Ass'n., 951 A.2d at 455
(dismissing public nuisance claim asserting that presence of lead pigment in residences
throughout state "interfered with a public right"), with NL Indus. Inc., 691 N.W.2d at 897
(allowing public nuisance action against lead paint manufacturer to proceed to trial); see also
Gifford, supra note 121, at 915-33 (noting that other collective causes of action include unjust
enrichment, indemnity, and misrepresentation).
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While it addresses the plaintiffs as a collective entity, the court
frequently also views the defendants as parts of a collective whole. It is
well-accepted tort doctrine that independent tortfeasors who have each
contributed to an indivisible harm are held jointly and severally liable for
the victim's damages. 126 But how would joint and several liability operate
when the litigation aims to hold utility companies and other industrial
polluters liable for global climate change to which literally billions
contribute and the percentage contribution of any individual defendant is
comparatively trivial?'27 Obviously, at least in some collective tort actions
involving numerous victims and contributors to their harms, the
adjudications are essentially unbounded.
2.

The Intentional Regulation of Nonparties

The second factor characterizing much public law tort litigation is the
explicit intent to impose a judicially created regulatory regime on product
manufacturers or other tortfeasors. Ordinarily, the loss minimization impact
of tort law occurs as a result of the accumulation of judgments in individual
lawsuits; those suits send regulatory signals to potential tortfeasors. 12' The
new paradigm of tort litigation is different. It seeks to impose explicit
regulatory regimes when those sponsoring such litigation believe that the
political branches of government have failed to act or that an existing
statutory or regulatory regime is insufficient and in need of replacement.
For example, consider the explanation of John P. Coale, one of the leading
private attorneys who assisted state and city governments in bringing
common law tort actions against tobacco and gun manufacturers: "They
failed to regulate tobacco and they failed regarding guns .... Congress is

126. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094, 1096 (5th Cir.
1973) (finding that where asbestos manufacturers contributed to asbestos dust at plaintiffs
worksites, they could be held jointly and severally liable for his disease even if it was
impossible to show "which particular exposure ... resulted in injury").
127. E.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2011) (dismissing
federal common law nuisance claims alleging that defendant utility companies contributed to
global wanning); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859-60 (5th Cir. 2009)
(considering claims that regional businesses contributed to the indivisible harm of global
warming); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (dismissing claims against ExxonMobil for contributing to global warming); People v.
Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17,
2007) (dismissing claims against automobile manufacturers for contributed to global warming).
128. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297-98 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner,
C.J.) (contrasting the "sheer magnitude" of liability facing defendants confronted by class action
litigation with that to which they are exposed by a series of individual actions).
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[and] lawyers are taking up the slack."12' 9 Similarly, a
not doing its job ....
New York assistant attorney general who played a critical role in the
climate change litigation later wrote of his frustration when the EPA failed
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions: "We are fortunate that we live in a
country with three branches of government . . . so that the unfortunate
inaction of0 one branch does not leave our citizens without hope or
' 13
recourse."
The proponents of this new form of litigation also see punitive damages
as essential to regulating or deterring the conduct of those that inflict mass
harms. Michael Rustad characterizes punitive damages as a tool to be used
"as a gap-filler to constrain corporate wrongdoing that is not punished and
deterred by the criminal law.' '31 For decades, courts and commentators
recognized deterrence as being one of the legitimate objectives of punitive
damages."' During the past generation, however, plaintiffs' attorneys and
scholars increasingly viewed punitive damages not only as a tool to deter
the specific defendant before the court from engaging in further
harmful
1 33
actors.
corporate
other
regulate
to
conduct but also as a means
Realistically, the impact of explicit regulation through the tort system is
unbounded. If American Electric Power Co. 134 had proceeded to a remedial

phase, the practical effect of any court-ordered reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions would have extended far beyond the five greenhouse gas emitters
present before the Court, just as punitive damages awards influence the
129. John Coale, Litigator for the Plaintiff, Government-Sponsored Litigation-What's
Next?, Remarks Before the Manhattan Institute Conference Series No. 1 (June 22, 1999), in
REGULATION BY LITIGATION: THE NEW WAVE OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED LITIGATION 64
(Manhattan Inst. for Policy Research ed., 1999), available at http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/pdf/mics 1.pdf.
130. Peter Lehner, Connecticut v. AEP: A Long History of Nuisance Law, 35 COLUM. J.
ENV'T. L. FIELD REP. 1, 7 (2010), available at http://www.columbiaenvironmentallaw.org/artic
les/connecticut-v-aep-a-long-history-of-nuisance-law.
131. Michael L. Rustad, The Supreme Court and Me: Trapped in Time with Punitive
Damages, 17 WIDENER L.J. 783, 788 (2008).
132. E.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (stating
that punitive damages are "aimed at deterrence and retribution"); Mathias v. Accor Econ.
Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that punitive damages limit outrageous
behavior by reducing the chance of profiting from such behavior); see also, e.g., Thomas B.
Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Present, and Future of
Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 474 (2008) (discussing the many purposes of punitive
damages).
133. See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights
and ImplicationsforReform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 111 (2002) (identifying deterrence of "future
wrongdoers" as a goal of punitive damages); Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 38
PEPP. L. REV. 433, 536-37 (2011) (describing role of punitive damages in regulating entire
automobile industry).
134. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
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activities of others within the same industry. In short, the public law tort
litigation of the past two decades is a very different creature from the
bounded tort adjudications of the preceding centuries.
II.

CONSTITUTIONALIZNG THE MODEL OF BOUNDED ADJUDICATION

During the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court began to
constitutionally mandate a version of bounded adjudication that echoes
Fuller's principles.13 5 The Court has held that as a matter of constitutional
law, courts may not:
adjudicate the rights of victims who are neither parties before the
court nor fall within well-defined categories of those who136may be
adequately represented, notably members of class actions;
consider harms to nonparty victims137when assessing a tortfeasor's
compensatory or punitive damages;
grant standing to plaintiffs claiming generalized and diffuse, rather
than specific and circumscribed, harms; 138 or
enjoin the harmful conduct of tortfeasors whose harmful activities
fall within the purview of a comprehensive federal regulatory
139
scheme, even if the scheme has not been effectively enforced.
The Court's requirement of bounded adjudication emerges from this
constellation of doctrinally disparate cases that rely on due process,140
justiciability doctrines inherent in Article III,41 and even the Supremacy
Clause.142
During most of the twentieth century, the United States Supreme Court
stayed on the sidelines as state courts oversaw the development of tort law.
The Court rarely reviewed tort actions between private parties that involved
neither a federal statute nor defamation or invasion of privacy claims
implicating First Amendment protections. However by the 1990s, mass
torts,143 huge punitive damages awards against corporations, and other
135. See supra notes 68-89 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 262-64 and
accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 158-68 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 169-86 and accompanying text.
138. See infra notes 200-25 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 238-53 and accompanying text.
140. See infra notes 158-86 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 187-237 and accompanying text.
142. See infra notes 238-53 and accompanying text.
143. Deborah R. Hensler and Mark A. Peterson define "mass torts" by reference to three
factors: "[1] the large number of claims associated with a single 'litigation'; [2] the
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variants of public law tort litigation encountered a formidable obstacle in
the Supreme Court. Since 2005, this trend has accelerated under Chief
Justice John Roberts's leadership of the Court. 1" According to Jeffrey
Rosen, the 5Roberts Court is particularly suspicious of "regulation by
' 14
litigation."
The Supreme Court now casts considerable influence over the
development of American tort law even though the Court traditionally left it
in the hands of state courts. Supreme Court decisions reflecting a model of
bounded adjudication that rest on the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause directly restrain state courts. Even though Article III justiciability
doctrines do not directly limit the types of cases that state courts may
adjudicate, when state courts consider requirements such as standing and
the political question doctrine, they frequently find the Supreme Court's
analysis of such doctrines highly persuasive.146 Finally, the Court's recent
opinion in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,147 holding that the
Clean Air Act displaced the federal common law of nuisance, suggests that
federal regulatory
in a future case the Court may find that comprehensive
148
actions.
law
common
statutes preempt state
The Court's decisions appear to reflect the influence of the emerging
model of bounded adjudication rather than an unprincipled bias in favor of
corporate defendants. For example, all of the Court's comparatively liberal
Justices joined Justice Ginsburg's opinion in American Electric Power Co.
Each of the current Justices once had a front row seat to observe either
Fuller's development of his model of adjudication or the ensuing debate
between Fuller and his public law antagonists, Chayes and Fiss. Each
attended law school-and presumably began to develop his or her own
unique understanding of adjudication--during a generation-long period
between 1957 and 1986.149 Six of the Justices attended Harvard and likely
commonality of issues and actors among claims within a litigation; and [3] the interdependence
of claims values." Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, UnderstandingMass Personal
Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 961, 965 (1993).
144. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 947,
956, 961-72 (2008) (concluding that "the Roberts Court is the most pro-business Court of any
since the mid-1930s").
145. Jeffrey Rosen, Big Business and the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 929, 932
(2009).
146. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 134 (3d ed. 2000).
147. 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
148. See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
149. This era began when Justice Scalia first enrolled at the Harvard Law School in 1957
and ended with Justice Kagan's graduation from the same school in 1986. Biographies of
Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREMECOURT.GOv, http://www.supremecourt.gov/
about/biographies.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2012).
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encountered the ideas of Fuller and later Chayes in the classroom either
from these scholars themselves or from their colleagues, 5 ' and three
attended Yale where Fiss was an influential intellectual presence among his
colleagues and students. 5'
Fuller first presented his "Forms and Limits of Adjudication" manuscript
to the Legal Philosophy Discussion Group at Harvard Law School in 1957,
and he taught courses based on these materials to students at the law school
during the 1960s. 5 ' When the HarvardLaw Review eventually published
Fuller's seminal article posthumously in 1978, its managing editor was none
other than today's Chief Justice, John Roberts. Many of the current Justices
probably were exposed to Fuller's theory of adjudication through their
study of the widely circulated materials on the legal process, edited by Hart
and Sacks.' 53 While attending law school in the years that followed Fuller's
death, today's junior Justices of the Court perhaps encountered either the
Hart and Sacks legal process materials or the then-raging debate between
Fuller's traditional model of bounded adjudication and the more activist,
public law orientation shared
by many of their teachers and Fuller's critics,
15 4
including Chayes and Fiss.

A.

Due Process and the New Tort Regime

Beginning in the mid-1990s, even before the appointment of Chief
Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court began to constitutionalize the model of
bounded adjudication, at least in the context of mass torts. The Court struck
down global settlements that bound future victims of asbestos-related
diseases who were neither parties before the trial court, nor even yet
showing symptoms of illness.' 55 More recently, in Philip Morris USA v.
Williams,'56 the Court reversed a huge punitive damages award punishing a
tobacco company for its actions that caused harm to victims of tobaccorelated diseases throughout the country, although only one of them was
before the court as a plaintiff.'57 Because the Court's ruling in Williams
benefited the defendant, and not the absent victims, it cannot be accurately
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Kenneth I. Winston, Special Editor's Note preceding Fuller, supra note 68, at 353
(providing account of events leading up to the publication of Fuller's manuscript).
153. Five members of the Supreme Court in 2002 had studied the legal process materials in
the classroom. Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction to The Legal Process,supra note 63, at li.
154. Bone, supra note 56, at 1274.
155. See infra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
156. 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
157. See infra notes 169-86.
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explained as an instance in which the Court recognized a right of
participation. Instead, it represents a distinct building block in a
constitutionally required architecture of bounded adjudication.

1.

Claimants' Due Process Rights to Meaningful Participation

The Court first hinted at due process limits on the ability of common law
tort litigation to bind nonparties when it addressed two global settlements
that arose in massive asbestos lawsuits. These purported settlements limited
the manufacturers' liability to unbounded classes of future victims of
asbestos-related diseases, including those who had been exposed to such
products but had yet to manifest symptoms. In Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor,'58 the parties' proposed settlement detailed a schedule of payments
to be made to victims who developed certain asbestos-related illnesses in
the future, as well as an administrative mechanism for considering claims
and disbursing payments.' 59 The Supreme Court held that those
asymptomatic individuals who had not yet filed a claim, but who had been
exposed to asbestos, were too different from one another and too different
from victims already diagnosed with illnesses to be certified as a single
class for class action purposes.60 On the surface, the holding in Amchem
rests on the Court's conclusion that plaintiffs failed to satisfy the class
certification requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 6 ' Nowhere in its opinion did the Supreme Court mention due
process.
6 2 the Supreme
Two years later in Ortiz v. FibreboardCorporation,'
Court rejected another attempt to use the class action mechanism to bind

158. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
159. Id. at 597, 603-04.
160. Id. at 626-27.
161. Id. at 629. The Supreme Court found that common questions of law and fact did not
predominate over questions affecting only individual members as required for certification
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Id. at 622. Specifically, some of the members of
the proposed class already suffered from any number of very different asbestos-related diseases,
while others did not. Id. at 624. The Court further noted, "Class members were exposed to
different asbestos-containing products, for different amounts of time, in different ways, and over
different periods .... Each has a different history of cigarette smoking, a factor that complicates
the causation inquiry." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court also held that
certification was not proper because the named class representatives could not "fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class" as required by Rule 23. Id. at 625-26. According to
the Court, "the critical goal [of] generous immediate payments" for the currently injured "tugs
against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an ample, inflation-protected fund for
the future." Id at 626.
162. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
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members of an indeterminate and unbounded, purported class of those
exposed to asbestos products but not yet symptomatic. 6 3 In Ortiz, unlike
Amchem, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized future claimants' due
process interests in participation. 64 Even though both Amchem and Ortiz
superficially relied upon the class certification requirements of Rule 23,
leading scholars of class action practice conclude that what really drove the
Court's analysis was "a fundamental tenet of constitutional due process.6
163. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864-65 (1999). Fibreboard and its principal
insurer agreed to settle both the 45,000 pending claims against the corporation and all future
claims for $1.535 billion, to be paid almost entirely by its principal insurer, with modest
contributions from Fibreboard itself and one other insurer. Id. at 824-25. Claimants would seek
compensation from a trust funded with these proceeds, and their rights to sue in court would be
extremely limited. Id. at 827. Counsel sought class certification of the exposure-only plaintiffs
under subsection (b)(1)(B) of Rule 23, which allows class actions if plaintiffs' separate actions
would impair the ability of similarly situated victims to protect their own interests. FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(b)(1)(B). Fibreboard argued that the settlement trust funds constituted a "limited fund," so
that the full payment of the earlier claims would deplete the funds available to pay victims who
filed later claims. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 841. Unlike Amchem, the limited fund class certification
established a mandatory class certification without any opportunity for class members to opt
out. Id. at 869-70. The Supreme Court rejected the class certification. Id. at 843 (noting that the
Advisory Committee, which wrote Rule 23, had not contemplated that a defendant's contention
that it lacked resources to pay claims justified mandatory class action certification).
164. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 846 (stating that at least in "mandatory class actions aggregating
damages claims implicate[s] the due process 'principle of general application in AngloAmerican jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in
which he is not designated as a party"') (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)).
165. Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999
SUP. CT. REV. 337, 353 (1999); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Futures Problem, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1901, 1911 (2000) (describing the central focus in the two opinions "as a matter of
constitutional due process"); Deborah R. Hensler, Bringing Shutts into the Future: Rethinking
Protectionof Future Claimants in Mass Tort Class Actions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 585, 587 (2006)
("[T]he Amchem and Ortiz majorities framed their rejection of both class action settlements on
procedural due process grounds .... "); Linda S. Mullenix, Standing and Other Dispositive
Motions After Amchem and Ortiz: The Problem of "Logically Antecedent" Inquiries, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REV. 703, 720 (2004) (reporting that "[Professor Laurence] Tribe's brief and oral
argument in Amchem attempted to constitutionalize the debate").
At least in some specific circumstances, the Supreme Court requires that each party bound
by a judicial decision have a personal right to participate in the adjudication. See, e.g., Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011) (holding that claims for individualized
damages cannot be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because absent class members lack the ability
to participate or opt-out); AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011)
("For a class-action money judgment to bind absentees in litigation, . . . absent members must
be afforded notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a right to opt out of the class."); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985) (holding that, in order to bind absent
plaintiffs on a claim for money damages, "plaintiff must receive notice plus an opportunity to be
heard and participate in the litigation"). Martin Redish recently argued that such a right, broadly
conceived, is inherently inconsistent with class action practice. See MARTIN H. REDISH,
WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION
LAWSUIT

1-3 (2009) (suggesting that class action lawsuits were never intended to "obtain[]
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The Supreme Court decisions in Amchem and Ortiz overwhelm the
ability of common law adjudication to address mass harms. A number of
scholars, including David Rosenberg, argue that mandatory class actions
represent the most effective means of both achieving optimal deterrence and
adequately compensating victims of mass harms. 166 He contends that
16
individual participation rights leave "everyone worse off' in the long run. 1
The mandatory class action, according to Rosenberg, is also the most
168
effective response to regulators' failure to prevent mass harms.
Obviously, Rosenberg speaks from a public law perspective, a perspective
implicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in Amchem and Ortiz.
2.

Punitive Damages as Extra-compensatory or Societal Damages

The Supreme Court explicitly recognized constitutional limits on the
ability of a court to consider the interests of nonparties in its punitive
damages decision in Philip Morris USA v. Williams.'69 Catherine Sharkey
argues that Williams "signifies verve for federal intrusion upon a

relief for many plaintiffs whose claims are insufficiently large to economically justify individual
litigation"). But see Resnik, supra note 24, at 135 ("[A]lthough the Wal-Mart opinion .. .
[states] that the 'class action is 'an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and
on behalf of the individual named parties only," that description has long since ceased to be
apt." (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550)).
Resnik argues that any individual's right to participate in seeking legal redress for mass
harms is largely illusory given the maldistribution of resources between businesses and victims
and the costs of litigation. Id. at 142, 145. While her observation may be valid in the context of
smaller consumer, employment, and civil rights claims, it seems inapposite in the context of
claims alleging significant personal injures where contingent fee agreements award plaintiffs
counsel adequately for their efforts.
In construing Amchem and Ortiz, Issacharoff argues that the "fundamental tenet of due
process" is best characterized not as a matter of the individual rights of absent class members,
but rather as a "question of governance, and the requirement that there be adequacy of
representation for absent class members." Issacharoff, supra, at 353; see also Owen M. Fiss,
The Allure of Individualism, 78 IOWA L. REV. 965, 970-71 (1993) (agreeing that the class
member's right is "not a right of participation, but rather ... the right to have one's interest
adequately represented"). Issacharoff later served as Reporter for the ALI's Principles of
Aggregate Litigation and his representational model permeates the Principles.AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, supra note 20, at § 1.05 cmt. b (providing that judges should "promote adequate
representation" in aggregate litigation).
166. David Rosenberg, Mandatory-LitigationClass Action: The Only Optionfor Mass Tort
Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 862 (2002); see also, e.g., Sergio J. Campos & Howard M.
Erichson, The Futureof Mass Torts, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 231, 234 (2011).
167. Rosenberg, supra note 166, at 863.
168. Id. at 832.
169. 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
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traditionally state-law area of torts."' 7° In the decades preceding Williams,
many scholars and influential judges viewed punitive damages from a law
and economics perspective. Punitive damages provided "extracompensatory" or "societal" damages-they forced tortfeasors to internalize
negative externalities that occur as a result of harms to nonparties to assure
that tortfeasors consider the possibility of such damages when they elect to
engage in harm-producing activity."' For example, Sharkey notes that
diffuse harms affect not only parties before the court and other identifiable
parties but also numerous additional victims of exposure to pollution, toxic
products or similar harms who, for one reason or another, are unlikely to
file suit.' 72 In her 2003 article, she explicitly acknowledges that courtordered damages for diffuse harms resemble "an effluent tax, or taxing
defendants for the general welfare."' 17 3 During recent oral arguments in
American Electric Power Co., 174 Justice Breyer hinted at a contrasting
perspective when he skeptically questioned plaintiffs counsel as to whether
a court could order a tax on carbon emissions as a solution to global climate
change."' Counsel admitted, "I don't think so."1 76
In Williams, the widow of a deceased cigarette smoker sued Philip
Morris, the manufacturer of Williams's preferred brand of cigarettes, for
negligence and deceit, alleging that the defendant knowingly and falsely led
him to believe that cigarette smoking was safe.' 77 During closing arguments,
plaintiff's attorney asked the jury to consider how many other people the
defendant had killed.' The trial court judge denied the defendant's request
for a jury instruction that would have informed the jury that it could not

170. Catherine M. Sharkey, Federal Incursions and State Defiance: Punitive Damages in
the Wake of Philip Morris v. Williams, 46 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 449,477 (2010).
171. Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 244-46 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring) (justifying punitive damages as social damages serving as a proxy for compensation
for harms to victims who will not sue); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal
Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 354 (2003) (arguing that punitive damages serve as "'societal
damages' designed to compensate others directly harmed but not before the court").
172. Sharkey, supra note 171, at 400, 404.
173. Id. at 400; see also Donald G. Gifford, Impersonatingthe Legislature:State Attorneys
General and Parens Patriae ProductLitigation, 49 B.C. L. REv. 913, 950-51 (2008) (discussing
the legislative nature of the Master Settlement Agreement that settled state tort litigation against
tobacco companies).
174. Transcript of Oral Argument, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527
(2011) (No. 10-174), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument
-transcripts/10-1 74.pdf.
175. Id. at 43, 61.
176. Id. at 61.
177. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349-50 (2007).
178. Id. at 350.
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punish the defendant for harm to nonparty victims,179 and the jury awarded
$79.5 million in punitive damages. 8 ' The U.S. Supreme Court held that
"the . . . Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages

award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or
those whom they directly represent, i.e., injury that it inflicts upon those
who are, essentially, strangers to the litigation."18 ' Although Justice Stevens,
as well as three other Justices, dissented from the Court's holding, even he
acknowledged the existence of due process limits on the ability of a court to
award compensatory damages to a plaintiff before the court "measured by
'
the harm that the conduct had caused to any third parties."182
Justice Breyer, writing for the five-member majority, offered two
justifications for the holding.'83 First, punitive damages that take into
account damages done to others deprive a defendant of "an opportunity to
present every available defense." '84 For example, Philip Morris might have
been able to show that some nonparty victims did not rely on its
misrepresentations-in other words, even in the absence of such
misrepresentations, the nonparty victims would not have stopped smoking.
In the prototypical, dispute-resolution case envisioned by Fuller, when an
individual victim sues a specific tortfeasor, the defendant has reasonable
notice of the plaintiffs allegations of facts supporting liability. However,
this is not the situation when the jury considers harms inflicted on unknown
numbers of anonymous, purported victims when awarding damages. In
these circumstances, the extent of the defendant's liability depends upon
what has happened to hundreds of thousands, even millions, of sometimes
similar and, inevitably often dissimilar individual harms for which issues
such as reliance, causation, and injury vary widely.8 5 The Williams
majority's second rationale for its holding was that "to permit punishment
179. Id. at 351.
180. Id. The trial court judge found the award excessive and reduced it to $32 million, but
the Oregon Court of Appeals reinstated the original award. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 48
P.3d 824, 843 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
181. PhillipMorris, 549 U.S. at 353. However, the majority went on to say that its decision
does not prevent the plaintiff from showing "harm to others in order to demonstrate
reprehensibility." Id. at 355. Justice Stevens in his dissent found this distinction to be
incoherent. Id. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 358-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 353-54.
184. Id. at 353 (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972)).
185. See Michael B. Kelly, Do Punitive Damages Compensate Society?, 41 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 1429, 1434-35 (2004) (concluding that "ascertaining the merits of the absent person's
claim" is the greatest problem with using punitive damages to redress harms for parties not
before the court); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560 (2011)
(reasoning that defendant-employer "is entitled to individualized determinations of each
employee's eligibility for backpay" under Title VII).
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for injuring a nonparty victim would add a standardless dimension to the
'
punitive damages equation."186
Both of Justice Breyer's rationales
ultimately address problems inherent in unbounded adjudication.
B.

Justiciability

The federal courts use the language of Article III's grant of judicial
power to the federal courts, limiting jurisdiction to "Cases" and
"Controversies," ' 187 as a second constitutional basis for imposing a
mandatory model of bounded adjudication. During the past decade, the
Supreme Court repeatedly indicated that these words "confine 'the business
of federal courts to questions ...in a form historically viewed as capable of

resolution through the judicial process."'" 88 According to Justice Kennedy,
"[i]n the English legal tradition, the need to redress an injury resulting from
a specific dispute taught the efficacy of judicial resolution and gave
legitimacy to judicial decrees."' 89 After reviewing the historical records of
186. Phillip Morris, 549 U.S. at 354. The jury likely would not hear specific evidence in
response to questions such as "How many such victims are there? How seriously were they
injured? [and] Under what circumstances did injury occur?" Id. In these circumstances, the
Court concluded, "[t]he jury will be left to speculate." Id. The "standardless dimension"
described by the Court is similar to the impossible tasks facing a trial court in climate change
litigation. See infra notes 265-73 and accompanying text.
187. U.S. CONST. art. III.
188. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
95 (1968)); see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009) (describing Article
III as restricting federal judicial power "to the traditional role of Anglo-American courts").
189. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1441 (2011). Justice
Kennedy added, "Continued adherence to the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III

maintains the public's confidence in an unelected but restrained Federal Judiciary." Id. at 1142.
He then quoted Chief Justice Marshall who once wrote that without such restrictions, "federal
courts might take possession of 'almost every subject proper for legislative discussion and
decision."' Id. (quoting 4 PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 95 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1984)).
Similarly, Justice Scalia finds that justiciability doctrines have "deep roots in the common-law
understanding, and hence the constitutional understanding, of what makes a matter appropriate
for judicial disposition." Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 339 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Nearly
a half-century earlier, Justice Frankfurter asserted:
In endowing this Court with 'judicial Power' the Constitution presupposed an historic content for that phrase and relied on assumption by the
judiciary of authority only over issues which are appropriate for disposition
by judges .... Judicial power could come into play only in matters that were

the traditional concern of the courts at Westminster and only if they arose in
ways that to the expert feel of lawyers constituted 'Cases' or 'Controversies.'
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). Several distinguished
scholars have questioned whether the conception of "Cases" and "Controversies" at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution was as limited as Justice Frankfurter concluded. E.g., Raoul
Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a ConstitutionalRequirement?, 78 YALE L.J.
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the Constitutional Convention and the ratification debates, James Leonard
and Joanne C. Brant recently concluded that "the Framers most likely
viewed the courts as places where individual litigants came to have actual
and personal grievances resolved.""19 Even for those members of the
Supreme Court who reject an originalist interpretation of this provision, the
meaning of the Article III requirement of a "Case" or "Controversy"
ultimately rests on the limits of judicial competence' 91 and separation of
powers. 92
'
Standing and the political question doctrine are the specific justiciability
doctrines that are most often implicated in implementation of the model of
bounded adjudication.' 93 The Supreme Court itself has yet to use these
doctrines to limit the federal courts' handling of mass tort litigation, but its
past decisions in other contexts suggest that it may not be long before the
Court addresses justiciability in this context. 94 Not surprisingly, federal
courts scholars find the standing and political question doctrines,
particularly when interpreted aggressively to prevent jurisdiction, to be
manifestations of what they usually refer to as the "dispute resolution
model,"' ' defined by reference to the same characteristics inherent in
Fuller's model of adjudication. 96 In contrast, the public law model of
Chayes and structural reform model of Fiss find their justiciability parallels
816, 819-27 (1969) (highlighting the difficulty in the Framers limiting judicial review to
"Cases" and "Controversies" without a clear definition of either term); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing
to Secure JudicialReview: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1269-75 (1961) (discussing
the historical background of the U.S. Constitution to challenge modern interpretations); Evan
Tsen Lee, DeconstitutionalizingJusticiability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV.
603, 636-41 (1992) ("[E]ven resort to history and tradition does not reveal a plain meaning of
'cases' and 'controversies."').
190. James Leonard & Joanne C. Brant, The Half-Open Door: Article Ill, the Injury-in-Fact
Rule, and the Framers' Planfor FederalCourts of Limited Jurisdiction, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1,

5-6 (2001).
191. See infra notes 260-78 and accompanying text.
192. See infra notes 209-12, 291-307 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 883
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (dismissing climate change litigation on political question and standing
grounds); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547
at *48 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (dismissing climate change litigation on political question grounds).
194. See infra notes 217-23, 235-37 and accompanying text.

195. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 72-73 (6th ed. 2009); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the
ConstitutionalMind: A Bicentennial Essay on the Wages of Doctrinal Tension, 91 CAL. L. REV.
1, 12-13 (2003); Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of
Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603, 626-27 (1992); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional
Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1368-71 (1973); Jonathan R. Siegel, A
Theory of Justiciability,86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 77-78 (2007).
196. FALLON ET AL., supra note 195, at 74 n.4.
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in what Richard Fallon calls the Supreme Court's "law declaration
' Fallon describes this model as assuming that the Supreme Court
model."197
and other federal courts have a special role "to declare and explicate legal
values-norms that transcend individual controversies."'' 8 He concludes
that the Court's recent justiciability holdings generally reflect the dispute
resolution model rather than the law declaration model. 199
1.

Standing

In a traditional tort case, the standing doctrine is superfluous. The injured
victim suffers a physical injury caused by the tortfeasor's conduct that can
be redressed by court-awarded compensation, thus satisfying the Supreme
Court's three elements of standing outlined in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife200 -an injury in fact, causation or traceability, and redressability.
However, the requirements of liability in public law model torts sometimes
diverge from the elements of standing. Consider the standing question in the
Supreme Court's recent opinion in the climate change litigation, American
Electric Power Co v. Connecticut.2° 1 In that case, eight states, the City of
New York, and three land trusts sued five electric utility companies, seeking
abatement of emissions from the defendants' fossil fuel-powered plants that
allegedly contributed to global climate change. °2 Four Justices of the
equally divided eight-member Court held that plaintiffs lacked standing. 0 3
Even if the plaintiffs proved facts establishing the required, common law
elements for both liability and the injunctive relief they sought, it is unlikely
that the court could realistically redress plaintiffs' injuries, a requirement
for standing. Even with the granting of requested injunctive relief,
greenhouse gas emissions from billions of others not before the court, as
well as from natural causes, would still cause the harms asserted by
plaintiffs. Because standing is a component of jurisdiction that must be
addressed before a court considers issues on the merits, including federal
197. Id. at 73 n.2 (referring the reader to Chayes and Fiss, among others, for elaboration of
the model).
198. Id. at 73; see also MARTIN H. REDDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL
ORDER 87-88, 103-06 (1991) (using the term "judicial-political model"); Lee, supra note 195,
at 627-28 (describing the 'public values' model"); Siegel, supra note 195 (calling this model a
"public law" or "special function" view).
199. FALLON ET AL., supra note 195, at 75.
200. 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
201. 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2011).
202. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S.Ct. 2527, 2533-34 (2011).
203. Id. at 2535. The Supreme Court unanimously held that "the Clean Air Act and the
EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common law right to seek abatement of carbondioxide emissions from fossil fuel fired power plants." Id. at 2537.
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preemption of state public nuisance claims, it is likely that the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, and probably ultimately the Supreme Court itself, will
soon face the question of whether plaintiffs have standing to pursue state
public nuisance claims in4 climate change litigation in Native Village of
20
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil.
Heather Elliott identifies three functions often regarded as underlying
standing, two of which are relevant here. 2 5 First, as the Supreme Court
recently stated in Massachusetts v. EPA,2 °6 standing ensures that the
"business of the federal courts" is confined "to questions presented in an
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution
2 7 In other words,
through the judicial process.""
here the Court echoes
Fuller's general concerns about the form and limits of the judicial
function. 28 The second and even more important foundation of standing
doctrine lies in the "pro-democracy,, 219 separation-of-powers concept that
undergirds the Article III delegation of federal judicial power.210 If a harm is
inflicted in a general and diffuse manner on all or many individuals, the
Supreme Court has held that the "matter is committed to the surveillance of
Congress, and ultimately to the political process., 211 The Court usually
refrains "from adjudicating 'abstract questions of wide public significance'

204. 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 873 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (noting an appeal to the Ninth Circuit,
including the preemption issue).
205. Heather Elliott, The Functionsof Standing, 61 STAN. L. REv. 459, 460-62, 468 (2008).
The third function identified by Elliott, not considered here, is that standing prevents the federal
courts from being conscripted by Congress in its power struggle with the President and
executive agencies. Id. at 468.
206. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
207. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
95 (1968)); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982) (noting that standing requires "'concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues"' (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)));
Elliott, supra note 205, at 460, 469-75 (discussing the adverse nature and proper interest
necessary for standing). But see Siegel, supra note 195, at 87-90 (casting doubt on so-called
"litigation-enhancing" arguments for standing doctrine).
208. See supranotes 67-89 and accompanying text.
209. Elliott, supra note 205, at 468.
210. See Maxwell L. Steams, Standing Back From the Forest: Justiciability and Social
Change, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1309, 1319 (1995) (noting that standing "helps to preserve" separation
of powers); Elliott, supra note 205, at 475-87 (describing the "pro-democracy function" of
standing). Steams also focuses on another distinctive aspect of the separation of powers
rationale for standing. He notes that legislatures, unlike courts, are able to refuse to decide an
issue until a legislative consensus is achieved. Steams, supra, at 1319. The standing requirement
reduces the ability of a litigant to prompt the court to change the status quo when the legislature
has refused to do so, thus protecting the elected body's decision not to act.
211. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
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which amount to 'generalized grievances,' pervasively shared and most
appropriately addressed by the representative branches. 2
Perhaps counterintuitively, application of Fuller's right of participation
often calls for federal courts to deny standing-that is, the right to
participate-when the plaintiffs purported injury is generalized or diffuse,
in other words, shared by numerous other members of society. Why? If
plaintiffs are allowed to pursue their generalized grievances, other victims
who suffer harms similar to those of the plaintiffs but who are not parties in
the original litigation will be effectively denied their own participation
rights. If the defendants prevail in the first adjudication, a nonparty victim
likely is effectively foreclosed from recovery in a subsequent proceeding,
either because competent plaintiffs' counsel are no longer willing to accept
the case on a contingent fee basis or because the precedential value of the
earlier adjudication results in dismissal of her case. Of course a victim who
is not the first to sue always faces this risk. However this probability
increases dramatically when the first adjudication is brought by someone
with only a generalized interest, because the adverse judgment likely is
more broadly applicable than it would be in litigation involving a specific
claim. Further, as Fuller warned, the initial plaintiff with the generalized
grievance may not pursue the claim with the same adversarial vigor or with
the same effectiveness as the victim who experienced a more specific
harm.213
Lea Brilmayer identifies a second manner in which allowing generalized
grievances to be heard blocks the participation rights of other victims." 4
Special interest groups often encourage and sponsor mass tort litigation.
They choose those victims whose harms are most likely to lead to an
outcome advancing the interest groups' own ideological agendas to be
plaintiffs. The ability of nonparty members of the general public with
different ideological perspectives to be heard effectively in these judicial

212. Valley Forge ChristianColl., 454 U.S. at 475 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
499-500 (1975)); see also, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (stating that standing
bars "adjudication of generalized grievances" that would be "more appropriately addressed in
the representative branches"); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
217 (1974) (holding that the "generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance...
is an abstract injury" that is not adequate for standing).
213. See FULLER, supra note 81, at 707 and accompanying text.
214. See Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or
Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 306 (1979) (arguing from the
"representation" perspective that due process problems arise if the initial litigant, often an
"ideological challenger" without a "personal stake" is allowed to represent the interests of
others and comparing this problem with the due process problems that arise in class action
certifications); Steams, supra note 210, at 1405-06.
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proceedings frequently is quite limited.215 Brilmayer contends that allowing
often ideologically driven parties to represent the rights of victims who are
not before the court is a violation of the nonparty victims' rights of selfdetermination.2 6
Adjudication of generalized grievances resulting in broad-based
remedies also increases the risk of harm to nonparties other than additional
victims or tortfeasors. For example, in global climate change litigation, the
generalized nature of the grievance likely results in broad-based remedial
action that affects not only the employees and customers of the defendants
before the court but also those in similar relationships with other emitters of
greenhouse gases. Perhaps other factories should be forced to abate
greenhouse gas emissions, but standing doctrines should not dramatically
exacerbate the problem that many affected by court orders lack effective
participation rights.
217
The Supreme Court's recent opinion in American Electric Power Co.

leaves the standing questions in global climate change cases in a decidedly
uncertain state.21 No grievance could be more generalized than the
worldwide effects of global climate change. In climate change cases, the
second Lujan standing element,219 causation or traceability, is key. The
harm caused to any particular victims results from the totality of all
greenhouse gas emissions from all users of fossil fuels throughout the world
regardless of their respective locations. The emission of any given quantum
of greenhouse gases from a utility plant in California causes no greater
melting of the snowpack in the California mountains than does the emission
of an equivalent quantum of greenhouse gases from an automotive plant
anywhere else in the world. The plaintiffs' assertion in these cases is
essentially that defendant utility companies are significant contributors to

215. Steams, supra note 210, at 1406.
216. Brilmayer, supra note 214, at 310-11.
217. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011).
218. In Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), the Supreme Court held, in a 5-4
ruling, that Massachusetts and the other plaintiff-states had standing as parens patriaeto sue the
Environmental Protection Agency to compel it to regulate the emissions of four greenhouse
gases under the provisions of the Clean Air Act. Id. at 519, 526. But this ruling does not
necessarily mean that states or other climate change plaintiffs have standing in federal courts to
sue private defendants on common law tort claims. Justice Stevens' majority opinion found that
the Act itself granted litigants a procedural right to challenge the EPA's rejection of its
rulemaking authority and that a state "is entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis."
Id. at 520. A state's relationship within the federal political structure is not a factor when it
brings a common law tort action against private defendants.
219. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
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the indivisible harm of global warming.22 They argue that all named
defendants should be held jointly and severally liable, and once liability is
established, the courts will sort out each defendant's appropriate portion of
the total damages caused by global warming or the total costs of
abatement." 1 Therefore, plaintiffs claim, they have satisfied the traceability
requirement. Further, they assert, the Lujan redressability standing element
does not require plaintiffs to "promise to solve the entire problem"22 but
'
only that the requested remedy "could provide some measure of relief."223
The reality is that in such an unbounded adjudication, the trial court
lacks the ability to trace the plaintiffs' harms to the greenhouse gas
emissions of any or all the named defendants, to determine the appropriate
share attributable to each defendant, or to provide any judicial relief that
would make one whit of difference to the plaintiffs. The liabilities of the
named defendants simply cannot be fairly and adequately adjudicated in the
judicial arena. Fuller almost certainly would conclude that climate change
litigation lies beyond the limits of adjudication, both because it would be
impossible to grant participation rights to all affected parties and because of
the polycentric nature of the issues in such litigation. Federal courts address
these same factors under the constitutional labels of standing224 and, as will
be explained in the next section,225 the political question doctrine. Whether
one uses the labels of the Supreme Court or Fuller's model, the result is the
same.

2.

The Political Question Doctrine

Another aspect of justiciability under Article 111,226 the political question
doctrine, also serves as a tool for the federal courts to constitutionally
require a model of bounded adjudication. Similar to the standing doctrine,
the political question doctrine's roots lie in the concept of separation of
220. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 345 (2d Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S.
Ct. 2527 (2011).
221. Id. at 346 (stating that "common law public nuisance action imposes liability on
contributors to an indivisible harm").
222. Id. at 349 n.24 (quoting Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Owens Coming Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d
957, 968 (D. Or. 2006)).
223. Id. at 348.
224. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (denying plaintiff standing to sue oil, energy, and utility companies for a federal common
law and state claim of public nuisance based on emission of greenhouses gases that allegedly

contributed to global warming).
225. See infra notes 226-37 and accompanying text.

226. U.S.

CONST.

art. III.
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powers227 and include both Article III minimal requirements and
"prudential" considerations of judicial restraint, such as the idea that a court
might not be the appropriate forum for deciding certain disputes. 8 In the
229 the Supreme Court identified six factors
leading case of Baker v. Carr,
that, individually or in combination with one another, may lead a court to
conclude that an issue poses a political question. Here, the second and third
factors are most relevant: "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving" the dispute and "the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion."230 In the 2004 case of Vieth v. Jubelirer,231 a plurality of the
Court concluded that claims that political gerrymandering violated
Constitutional provisions were nonjusticiable on political question
grounds.232 Justice Scalia's opinion rested squarely on the second Baker
factor-namely, the absence of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving the dispute. 23 3 He interpreted the grant of judicial
power in Article III as limited to cases where the court may "act in the
manner traditional for English and American courts. 234
Unbounded adjudications involve disputes with thousands of potential
victims and/or thousands of potential tortfeasors, some of whom are parties
before the court but most of whom are not. Further, unbounded
adjudications often concern problems that are unavoidably polycentric in
nature.235 In these situations, judicially discoverable and manageable
standards often do not exist, either for resolving the liability question or for
crafting and implementing a remedy. In the climate change litigation, each
of the four federal district courts that would have been responsible for
hearing and adjudicating the cases dismissed the complaints on the grounds
227. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) ("[N]onjusticiability of a political question is
primarily a function of the separation of powers.").
228. See Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question", 79 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1031, 1043-45 (1984-1985) (explaining the "prudential" version of political question
doctrine).
229. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
230. Id. at 217. In Baker's numerical order, the remaining factors are: (1) "a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;" ...
(4) "the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government;" (5) "an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made;" and (6) "the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question." Id.
231. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
232. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305-06 (2004).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 278.
235. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
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that they posed nonjusticiable political questions."' For example, the
Kivalina trial court found that it lacked judicially discoverable and
manageable standards to reach a principled decision on material liability
issues, such as whether defendants' carbon emissions were unreasonable.
The court explicitly identified the unbounded nature of its adjudicatory
tasks when it noted that every person or business that uses fossil fuels
contributes to the harms alleged by the plaintiffs.237
C.

Displacementand Preemption

The Supreme Court also mandates the model of bounded adjudication by
using a third set of doctrines, those of displacement and preemption. When
a unanimous Court decided American Electric Power Co.,238 it held that the
congressionally-enacted Clean Air Act and the EPA actions implementing it
displaced any federal common law of nuisance claims against the utility
companies.239 Provided that a statute is constitutional, it always trumps
judge-made common law.24° Congressional displacement of federal
common law 24' parallels Congressional statutes that "preempt" state
common law under the Supremacy Clause,242 except that in preemption

236. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 883 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (dismissing federal and state nuisance claims on standing and political question grounds);
California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *38
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (dismissing federal common law nuisance claim on political question
grounds); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(dismissing federal and state nuisance claims on political question grounds), vacated and
remanded, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011); see also Comer v.
Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 860 n.2 (5th Cir. 2009) (reporting district court's ruling from
the bench that the case represented a nonjusticiable political question).
237. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 877 n.4.
238. 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2011).
239. Id. at 2537.
240. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313, 315 n.8 (1981) (stating the Court
has "always recognized that the federal common law is 'subject to the paramount authority of
Congress' and "[w]hen Congress has spoken its decision controls" (quoting New Jersey v.
New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931))).
241. Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 313-15. In holding that the common law had been displaced,
the Court relied upon both the comparative institutional competency of specialized
administrative agencies created by Congress when compared with that of courts, id. at 317, and
separation of powers concerns. Id. at 325.
242. The Court often uses the word "displace" in the context of a state law being preempted
as well as when a federal statute displaces the common law. E.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic
Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1451 (2010) (discussing when a federal
statute will "displace" a state law); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 335 (2008)
(discussing the "scope of Congress' displacement of state law"); Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 315
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cases, the Court recognizes a strong presumption against preemption
flowing from the states' traditional police powers.2 43
At least until American Electric Power Co., the Court regarded the
critical question to be whether the purpose of a congressionally-enacted
statute included the displacement of the federal common law. 244 In
American Electric Power Co., the Court focused on a different set of issues

and, in its short opinion, repeatedly addressed the comparative institutional
competences of Congress and the EPA, on one hand, and the federal courts
on the other hand, to remedy problems posed by global climate change.245
Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court describes the polycentric nature of
the decisions necessary to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. 246 Further, she
recognizes that input into the adjudicative decision must come from those
who participate before the court, and not others who offer advice about the
effects of the decision on nonparties. 247 The Court implicitly recognizes that
tort adjudication cannot solve generalized or diffuse problems.2 48
n.8 (explaining the use of the word "displace" in the context of a state law being preempted as
well as when a federal statute displaces the common law).
243. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 623-24 (2009) (discussing the presumption
against preemption); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (recognizing the
presumption). In American Electric Power Co., the Court comes close to implicitly recognizing
the opposite presumption when the federal common law is at issue. The Court stated, "'[W]hen
Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law
...the need for such an unusual exercise of law-making by federal courts disappears."' Am.
Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting
Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 314). The Court continued by noting that "[1]egislative displacement of
federal common law does not require the 'same sort of evidence of a clear and manifest
[congressional] purpose' demanded for preemption of state law." Id. (quoting Milwaukee, 451
U.S. at 317).
244. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485).
245. Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2537-40. A handful of opinions in the Court's
previous displacement and preemption decisions allude to similar justifications. E.g., Wyeth,
555 U.S. at 604 (Alito, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the holding of the Court that "a state tort
jury, rather than the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), is ultimately responsible for
regulating warning labels for prescription drugs"); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S.
861, 883 (2000) ("The agency is likely to have a thorough understanding of its own regulation
and its objectives and is 'uniquely qualified' to comprehend the likely impact of state
requirements."); Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 316-17 (relying on both separations of powers and the
comparative institutional competency of specialized administrative agencies compared with that
of courts in holding that federal common law was displaced).
246. Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2539 ("The appropriate amount of regulation in any
particular greenhouse gas-producing sector cannot be prescribed in a vacuum . . . informed
assessment of competing interests . . . [including] environmental benefit potentially achievable,
our Nation's energy needs and the possibility of economic disruption must weigh in the
balance.").
247. Id. at 2540.
248. Id. (noting that "[s]imilar suits could be mounted ... against 'thousands . . .' of other
defendants").

HeinOnline -- 44 Ariz. St. L.J. 1146 2012

44:1 109]

CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDING

1147

The factors discussed by the Supreme Court in its opinion in American
Electric Power Co. closely resemble those that might have been considered
by the Court if it had decided the case on the basis of the political question
doctrine.149 The Court notes that the plaintiffs were asking a federal district
court judge to determine both the reasonableness of the quantity of the
defendants' greenhouse gas emissions and the feasibility of abatement."'
Without stating so explicitly, the Court suggests that in the context of global
warming, there are no "judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving" the dispute'5 and that resolution of these issues requires an
"initial policy determination" from the politically accountable branches of
government,"' in other words, the second and third Baker factors signaling
a political question.253
By using displacement to shut down climate change litigation based on
federal common law, the Supreme Court once again reined in a decidedly
unbounded adjudication. Climate change litigation contrasts sharply with a
model of bonded adjudication. Affected parties cannot all appear before the
court to present proof and reasoned arguments. Courts cannot address the
issues that must be resolved through reasoned elaboration. Both legal
process theorists and a unanimous Supreme Court conclude that these issues
are ones that must be handled by the EPA or Congress.
III.

THE MODEL OF BOUNDED ADJUDICATION-PROTECTING
DEMOCRACY OR A RELIC OF THE PAST?

The current Supreme Court appears to be committed to constitutionally
requiring a Fullerian understanding of common law adjudication and, in the
process, prohibiting public law tort litigation that collectivizes diffuse
harms, particularly when such litigation aspires to impose a judiciallycreated regulatory regime. For example, early in the oral arguments in
American Electric Power Co., Justice Scalia expressed his concern about
249. See supra notes 226-37 and accompanying text.
250. Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540.
251. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
252. Id.
253. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. The Court even suggested that there are
"international" implications of any court ruling restricting greenhouse gas emissions, Am. Elec.
Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2532, a factor that sometimes convinces courts that the issue before it
is committed by the Constitution to the President and therefore establishes a political question.
Both the Second Circuit in Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. and the district court in Kivalina
agreed that the international implications of global climate change did not make it a political
question. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 325 (2d Cir. 2009); Native Vill. of
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 873 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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using standing to dismiss the case, because he feared that the litigation
could simply be re-filed in a state court, where the results might be even
worse.254 The message was clear: Justice Scalia intended to drive a stake
through the heart of any adjudication as unbounded in nature as global
climate change litigation. But the normative issue remains: When Fuller
writes of the limits of adjudication that underlie his bounded adjudication
model and when the Supreme Court constitutionally mandates such a
model, are they wrong?
In this Part, I begin by assessing three separate but intertwined normative
justifications for the model of bounded adjudication: (1) judicial
competence and accuracy in adjudication;255 (2) the role of participation by
those directly affected by the adjudication in establishing its legitimacy in a
democratic society; 256 and (3) the commitment of generalized grievances to
the politically accountable branches as a result of constitutional separation
of powers. 21' Finally, I assess the arguments of proponents of public law tort
litigation that, notwithstanding traditional proprieties, unbounded
adjudication is pragmatically necessary, in order to both (1) enable injured
parties to recover when traditional notions of causation would otherwise
prevent recovery 258 and (2) establish regulatory regimes to prevent serious
societal
harms when the politically accountable branches of government
9
fail.

25

A.

The Limits of JudicialCompetence

In this section, I investigate whether courts using generally accepted
judicial methods are able to accurately determine liability and fashion
effective remedies in unbounded tort adjudication. In the past, concerns
about the limits of judicial competence usually arose when judicial decrees
implemented constitutional protections, such as in school desegregation and
prison reform cases, where the focus was largely on the nature of judicially
254. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5-6, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct.
2527 (2011) (No. 10-174), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments
/argument transcripts/10-174.pdf (asking defense counsel whether dismissal on standing
grounds will do any good because "[t]he suit will just be brought in State court" and expressing
the opinion that counsel "would frankly rather have Federal judges do it, probably").
255. See infra notes 260-78 and accompanying text; see also Resnik, supra note 24, at 88
(identifying "utilitarian concerns for accuracy" as justification for "inquiry into the quality of
procedure").
256. See infra notes 279-90 and accompanying text.
257. See infra notes 291-307 and accompanying text.
258. See infra notes 308-21 and accompanying text.
259. See infra notes 323-34 and accompanying text.
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not the

prerequisite recognition

of rights

and

liabilities.2 60 As I illustrate below, 2 6 1 public law tort litigation tests the limits

ofjudicial competence in both the liability and the remedial phases.
To review briefly, a model derived from Fuller's understanding of
adjudication rests on the following principles:
An adjudication cannot directly determine the rights, liabilities, or
interests of nonparties, with a few specific exceptions, such as
when the
nonparty's interests are adequately protected by a class
262
action;
A court cannot consider polycentric issues; 263 and
A party must make a claim based on a rule, principle, or standard
pre-dating the litigation and direct his proofs and arguments so as
to enable the court to resolve the case under this criterion for
decision.264
Global climate change litigation represents the clearest example of why
unbounded adjudication exceeds the limits of judicial competence in both
its liability and remedial phases. Consider the application of Fuller's first
factor. In order to decide whether any particular defendant's contributions
to the collective, indivisible harm of global warming are unreasonable, an
element of liability for the public nuisance claim,265 the court would be
required to compare the relative costs and benefits of each emitter's
contribution with those of all the billions of nonparties who emit
greenhouse gases throughout the world. No court, even with the assistance
of expert special masters, is capable of performing this limitless number of
analyses necessary to determine the named defendants' liabilities. Further,
as previously noted,266 the court's remedy would necessarily set specific
260. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Commentary-Some Reflections on the Judicial Role:
Distinctions, Roots, and Prospects, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 817, 818 (1979), available at
http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/lawreview/vo1979/iss3/12 ("[T]he problem of judicial
competence-of institutional expertise and effectiveness-is characteristically associated with
remedies, not rights.").
261. See infra notes 265-75 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text; see also William A. Fletcher, The
DiscretionaryConstitution: Institutional Remedies and JudicialLegitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635,
646-49 (1982) (explaining that Fuller believed polycentric problems were not fit for
adjudication and agreeing that polycentric issues pose a major problem for trial courts).
264. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
265. E.g., State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 446 (R.I. 2008) (noting that an
"unreasonable interference" is a necessary element of a public nuisance claim); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 B (1979) (defining "unreasonable interference" as essential element of
public nuisance).
266. See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
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emissions standards that, viewed pragmatically, would likely affect both the
rights of countless other nonparty victims of global climate change as well
as the liabilities of numerous nonparty contributors to global warming.
Common law climate change litigation also violates Fuller's second
admonition that courts should neither consider polycentric issues nor decide
issues on the basis of "managerial" factors, in contrast to judicially
appropriate standards determined through "reasoned elaboration. 267
Nothing about the judicial process grants the judge either the competence or
the authority to prioritize or ration greenhouse gas emissions among a group
of industries and consumers, all of whom are contributing to a worldwide
problem but are also engaged in activities benefiting society. Precedent and
legal reasoning fail to provide the answer. Even critics of Fuller's principles
of adjudication fall back on the idea that such complex cases will not be
adjudicated, but rather negotiated among the parties. 268 For example, Ralph
Cavanagh and Austin Sarat admit that "[i]mposing the Procrustean frame of
a 'principled' solution on such subject matter is likely to constitute an
exercise in futility at best and at worst to exacerbate already complicated
problems. 269
Finally, Fuller's third requirement of adjudication-the idea that the
parties must make a claim based on a rule, principle or standard-lies at the
core of his understanding of adjudication. 27" The Supreme Court wisely
gives this proposition constitutional significance when it identifies the lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards as a factor in
determining justiciability.27 Richard Fallon writes that the criteria
delineating the concept of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
include "[a]dministrability [w]ithout [o]verreaching the [c]ourts' [e]mpirical
[c]apacities, 272 the court's competence to structure remedies, determinacy,
and the ability to generate consistent and predictable results.

27 3

If applied to

climate change litigation, both Fallon's administrability and remedialcompetence factors clearly support a finding of nonjusticiability. Tort
standards such as "reasonableness" may be determinate and likely to
generate consistent and predictable results in the context of circumscribed
torts, such as whether a driver is driving unreasonably fast under all the
267. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 97.
269. Ralph Cavanagh & Austin Sarat, Thinking About Courts: Toward and Beyond a
Jurisprudenceof Judicial Competence, 14 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 371, 405 (1980).
270. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
272. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., JudiciallyManageable Standardsand Constitutional Meaning,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1291 (2006).
273. Id.at 1289-92.
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circumstances. However, when numerous courts throughout the country
determine whether emissions of a given quantum of greenhouse gases,
considered alongside the economic consequences of judicial regulation and
the contributions of other emitters to global climate change, are
unreasonable, their conclusions are likely to be indeterminate, inconsistent,
and unpredictable.
Global climate change lawsuits, which represent litigation of an
unprecedented scope, clearly exceed the institutional capacity of a court
acting in a principled manner, thus validating the Supreme Court's (and
Fuller's) model of bounded adjudication, at least in this single instance. But
does the same conclusion necessarily follow when we consider either the
punitive damage awards against the tobacco manufacturer in Williams,
where the jury was invited to consider harm to other smokers,274 or the
asbestos compensation plan for future claimants?275 At this point in the
discussion, I consider only the question of whether a court is capable of
reaching an accurate and fair substantive conclusion through the use of
appropriate judicial processes.
Standing alone, judicial competence concerns do not justify the Supreme
Court's decision to reject the administrative compensation plan for future
asbestos claimants in Amchem and in Ortiz. Richard Nagareda correctly
analogized the asbestos compensation schemes in these cases to workers'
compensation systems.276 Actuaries working for insurance companies
routinely and accurately calculate the amounts necessary to fund benefits to
be paid to workers' compensation claimants as well as to many other sets of
future claimants. Further, to the extent that the Amchem holding rests on the
possible unequal treatment of current and future claimants, courts are both
experienced and institutionally well-equipped to evaluate claims of unequal
treatment. Hence the holdings in Amchem and in Ortiz cannot be justified
on judicial competence grounds.
Nor do judicial competence concerns, considered in isolation from other
factors, justify the Court's holding in Williams. The trial judge invited the
jury to consider the harms caused to nonparty victims by the
misrepresentations of the defendant-tobacco manufacturer only to guide its
quantification of punitive damages. As previously noted,277 the Supreme
Court reversed the punitive damages award, in part, because it did not
afford the defendant an opportunity to avail itself of all the defenses it might
have if sued by any of the nonparty victims. However, neither the presence
274. See supra notes 177-86 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
276. NAGAREDA, supra note 15, at 76-77; but see infra note 322 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
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of the nonparty victims at trial nor even the identification of specific
nonparty victims is necessary for this purpose. The defendant might have
proffered survey research that would have informed the jury about the
percentage of nonparty victims who would not have stopped smoking even
if the defendant had not misrepresented facts and the percentages of claims
to which the defendant had other viable defenses.278
In summary, the utilitarian values of judicial competency and accuracy
justify a model of bounded adjudication in the extreme situation of global
climate change litigation. However, standing by themselves, they do not
rationalize the Supreme Court's more widespread application of the model.
B.

Participationas a Means ofLegitimating Adjudication in a
DemocraticSociety

Deontological considerations as well as utilitarian ones justify the model
of bounded adjudication. Regardless of the wisdom or fairness of
substantive outcomes, adjudication, as a form of state coercion within a
democracy, requires participation by both the victims and the tortfeasors
whose rights, liabilities, or interests are directly affected.279 Participation
rights protect self-determination and avoid paternalism.28 ° As Lea Brilmayer
writes, "If I have a personal interest in the dispute, a tangible stake, then I
seem to have both a moral and a legal right to involve myself." 81 According
to Jerry Mashaw, rendering decisions that affect an individual without his
participation reflects a loss of "dignity and self-respect" for that person that,

278. See, e.g., Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 338 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(recounting testimony of an expert that 2.4 times as many smokers would have quit in the
absence of defendant's misrepresentations and finding that this use of statistical proof did not
violate defendant's due process rights); see also, e.g., In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 15354 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (relying on statistical proof in a nationwide class action against a tobacco
company to prove numbers of smokers' illnesses resulting from defendant's
misrepresentations), rev'd, 407 F.3d 125, 140 (2d Cir. 2005) (reversing and decertifying the
class for failure to satisfy class certification requirements). See generally Laurens Walker &
John Monahan, Sampling Liability, 85 VA. L. REv. 329 (1999) (providing examples of statistical
analysis being used in the courtroom and explaining that statistical evidence can serve as the
necessary proof of causation required for liability).
279. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Values, 44 U. CHI.
L. REv. 28, 49 (1976); Resnik, supra note 24, at 88 (arguing that "the demand for subsidizing
and equalizing opportunities to participate . . . comes in service of democratic values that
recognize the contribution of and need for diverse voices and participants being heard in social
orders").
280. Brilmayer, supra note 214, at 310, 313.
281. Id. at 313.
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in turn, leads to alienation.282 Further, the lack of participation by victims in
adjudication, such as future asbestos claimants, also implicates equality
values when parties with interests in direct opposition to their own, such as
asbestos manufacturers, are present before the court.283
The Supreme Court appears to have recognized the deontological
importance of participation rights in Amchem when it held that in a
settlement-only class action, the trial court's evaluation of the fairness of
the settlement, albeit required, did not replace the need to determine
whether the members of the class were adequately represented.284 Further,
the Court has already established that when a court adjudicates a common
law claim for damages, the victim must be provided 285
with individual notice,
an opportunity to participate, and the right to opt out.

When the ALI (in its Principles of Aggregate Litigation),2 86
Issacharoff,2 87 and Fiss 88 attempt to legitimize the proxy's representation of
individual victims in collectivized litigation as "a question of
governance, '289 they ignore the importance of participation as a means of
legitimizing judicial authority. The Principles analogize the proxy's role to
those of corporate directors and officers in representing shareholders.2 9
However, persons who will be directly affected by an adjudication are
different from those who voluntarily (and usually with some sophistication)
invest in corporations. In contrast, victims do not voluntarily seek harm, nor
do defendants voluntarily pursue litigation.

282. Mashaw, supra note 279, at 50.
283. Id.at 53. Mashaw advises caution in changing the "modes of operation," such as
common law adjudication, that form the fabric of our social order. id. at 55. He warns that
changes justified by "instrumental rationality" often result in unforeseen consequences. Id.
284. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622 (1997).
285. See supra note 165.

286. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 20, at § 1.05 cmt. b (providing that judges
should "promote adequate representation" in aggregate litigation but may "limit the control of
parties and represented persons" over the litigation).
287. Issacharoff, supra note 165, at 347.
288. Fiss, supra note 165, at 970-71.
289. Issacharoff, supra note 165, at 353; see also NAGAREDA, supra note 15, at 220
(concluding that class actions for mass torts "involve governance, not litigation").
290. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 20, at § 1.05 cmt. d (stating that the literature
on corporate governance has many "analogues that are or could be deployed in aggregate
lawsuits with beneficial effects"); § 2.07 cmt. c (suggesting that corporate analogues are useful
in analyzing victims' due process rights in both preclusion and class action contexts).
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Separationof Powers

Fuller viewed "the lawyer as an architect of social structures."29 ' Much
of his work, including The Forms andLimits of Adjudication,2 92 focuses on
which issues should be decided by adjudication and which by legislation. 9 3
The same idea lies at the heart of the concept of separation of powers. 94
The case and controversy requirement of Article III, according to the

Supreme Court, "assumes particular importance in ensuring that the Federal
Judiciary respects 'the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a
democratic society.' ' 295 In Mistretta v. United States, 296 the Court quoted
James Madison's admonition that "'[i]n republican government the

legislative authority, necessarily, predominates. ',297

More recently, James Henderson writes that "in a representative

democracy, macro-economic regulation is accomplished most appropriately
by elected officials and their lawful delegates., 298 Each of the public law
tort cases that the Supreme Court has considered would have resulted in
judicial regulatory orders that more closely resemble legislative regulation
than they do the outcomes of traditional adjudication. 299 For example, the
proposed settlements in Amchem and Ortiz would have established an
administrative compensation system to pay those who manifested asbestos-

291.
1981).
292.
293.
note 63,
claims).
294.

LON L. FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 265 (Kenneth I. Winston, ed.
Fuller, supra note 68.
See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text. See generally HART & SACKS, supra
at 979-81 (discussing the role of legislation versus private adjudication in private

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (allocating all federal legislative powers to the Congress); U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1 (allocating all executive power in the President); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1
(placing all judicial power in "one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain").
295. Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (quoting Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 750 (1994)); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 750 (explaining that Article III
limitations are based on "constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected,
unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government") (quoting Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699
F.2d 1166, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring)).
296. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
297. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 350 (James Madison) (Jacob E.Cooke ed., 1961).
298. James A. Henderson, Jr., The Lawlessness of Aggregative Torts, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV.
329,338 (2005).
299. See NAGAREDA, supra note 15, at 76-77 (analogizing the unsuccessful attempts of
counsel in the asbestos class action litigation to achieve global settlements with the enactment
of workers' compensation systems during the initial decades of the twentieth century); George
L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class Actions, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 521, 568 (1997) (arguing that a global asbestos settlement "more closely resembles a
legislative compensation plan than a judgment in a tort case").
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related illnesses in the future.3"' The settlement in Amchem would have
created a payment grid showing the requirements for receiving
compensation and the amount to be awarded based on the seriousness of the
claimant's illness.30 ' The plan would have governed the rights of as many as
hundreds of thousands of claimants who were unknown and unidentified at
the time the settlement agreement became operative.
Separation of powers concerns also play a decisive role in Williams, if
less obviously so. Tom Colby reasons that punishing a defendant for harm
done to the plaintiff is a legitimate goal of private civil adjudication, but
punishing defendants for larger scale or aggregate harm is a role for
criminal law.30 2 Most often, the legislature plays an inherent role in criminal
law-the passing of criminal statutes-that it does not play in tort
adjudication. The Supreme Court in Williams signals that if a corporation
harms numerous, unidentified nonparty victims who are not before the
court, it is not a matter that can be handled through private adjudication. In
doing so, the Court significantly alters the allocation of powers among the
coordinate branches of government by reducing judicial power to effect
general deterrence and by concomitantly increasing reliance on the
legislature and administrative agencies to deter activities causing
widespread harm.
Climate change litigation actions also implicate separation of powers
concerns. The society-wide (indeed worldwide), diffuse, and generalized
harms caused by climate change are harms that our constitutional structures
suggest the political branches should handle. Maxwell Steams writes that
Congress, not the courts, is the institution that should respond when all of us

300. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 620 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd sub nom.
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (noting that the proposed settlement
"purports to settle all present and future claims of class members" and "establishes an
administrative procedure that provides compensation for claimants meeting specified exposure
and medical criteria"); Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.), 134 F.3d 668, 679 (5th Cir.
1998), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999)
(comparing the "allocation decisions" for compensation in the proposed settlement to those
proposed in Amchem).
301. See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 620 (explaining a proposed "range of damages" to be
awarded to claimants based on the seriousness of their illness, using "objective criteria for
medical diagnoses").
302. Colby, supra note 132, at 479. Several other commentators on punitive damages reach
somewhat similar but distinct conclusions. See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort
Reform, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1093, 1096-99 (2005) (concluding that a judicial remedy seeking
to punish the defendant and deter that defendant from violating plaintiffs rights in the future is
civil in nature, but one that seeks to deter the defendant from violating rights of others is
criminal).
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have been injured.3" 3 Climate change litigation is simply not the kind of case
or controversy envisioned by Article III of the Constitution. Unlike the
typical tort plaintiff, such as the victim of an auto accident, there is no
single harm at issue in climate change litigation. Nor is the harm as
circumscribed, discrete, and localized as it has been in past nuisance claims
that alleged air or water pollution.30 4
As previously noted,3" 5 achieving the optimal mixture of regulation
across all greenhouse-gas emitters and industries requires weighing the
relative societal costs and benefits of reducing emissions from each. Such
choices cannot be accomplished through the application of judicial
standards. Legislatures and administrative agencies, not courts, should
determine the trade-offs between ecological and economic considerations
and make the thousands of decisions concerning a myriad of issues required
to enact a national emissions reduction program. The legitimacy of the
actions of administrative agencies within a constitutional framework rests
not on reasoned elaboration, but rather on the accountability of these
agencies to the political branches of the government.3 6 In contrast, federal
courts are not politically accountable.3"7

303. Steams, supra note 210, at 1406 (noting that "to the extent that we all have been

injured" it is the duty of Congress, not the courts, to "act on our behalf').
304. E.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907) (enjoining a Tennessee
factory from emitting pollution into Georgia's air); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 526
(1906) (declining to enjoin Illinois from dumping sewage into the Mississippi River).
305. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
306. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(noting that administrative agencies "may ...properly rely upon the incumbent administration's
views of wise policy to inform its judgments" and that "it is entirely appropriate for this
political branch of the Government to make such policy choices").
307. Even state court judges, often elected, are not politically accountable in the same
manner as members of legislatures and governors. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R.
4.1(A)(12) & (13) (2007) (providing that judges and judicial candidates shall not make
statements that could be understood either "to affect the outcome or impair the fairness" of an
adjudication or "make pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the
impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office"); HART & SACKS, supra note
63, at 643 ("[T]he popular election of judges does not in actual practice mean political
accountability for particular decisions, nor is it ordinarily so understood."). But see Thomas J.
Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of ArbitrarinessReview, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 761, 767
(2008) (reporting empirical findings that federal judges appointed by a Democratic president
were more likely to cast liberal votes in arbitrariness review of EPA and NLRB decisions than
their Republican counterparts).

HeinOnline -- 44 Ariz. St. L.J. 1156 2012

CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDING

44:1109]
D.

1157

The Necessity Counter-arguments

In this section, I consider two frequently proffered, and potentially
compelling, responses to the arguments in the previous sections that it is

inappropriate for courts to engage in unbounded adjudication.
1.

The Victim's Right to Recovery

As discussed in Part I, because of the inability of many victims of mass

torts to identify the specific businesses that caused their respective harms,
aggregating their injuries and viewing those injuries as a collective harm is
often the only means available to prove the causal connection between the
victim and the tortfeasor required to establish liability.30 8 Further, in the
specific context of the asbestos settlements, manufacturers were
understandably unwilling to agree to a settlement that did not limit their
liability to all claimants, including those not yet symptomatic at the time of
the settlement.0 9
Many courts,31 0 commentators,3 11 and public spokespersons 312 believe
that the Supreme Court just has it wrong when it implements the model of

bounded adjudication and denies victims compensation. For them, common
law courts should assure a remedy for every wrong, or even for every
harm.31 3 More than forty state constitutions guarantee the right of access to
courts to obtain a remedy for a wrong. 314 These provisions give voice to
popular aspirations regarding the role of tort law in compensating victims
308. See supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
310. E.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009) (allowing
global climate change litigation to proceed in a public nuisance claim), rev'd sub nom. Am.
Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011); Collins v. Eli Lilly, 342 N.W.2d 37, 45
(Wis. 1984) (reasoning that when an adequate remedy for harm does not already exist under the
common law, the courts should fashion one).
311. See, e.g., T. Hunter Jefferson, Constitutional Wrongs and Common Law Principles:
The Casefor the Recognition of State ConstitutionalTort Actions Against State Governments,
50 VAND. L. REV. 1525, 1571 (1997) (claiming that the law "guarantees a remedy for every
wrong").
312. See Thomas D. Lehrman, Reconsidering Medical Malpractice Reform: The Case for
Arbitration and Transparency in Non-Emergent Contexts, 36 J. HEALTH L. 475, 479 (2003)
("The commonly held belief that there ought to be a remedy for every wrong still resonates with
citizens and plaintiffs."); Editorial, The Court and Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2011,
at A24 (calling for the Supreme Court to provide a remedy in American Electric Power Co.).
313. See Ashby v. White, 14 How. St. Tr. 695, 814 (Q.B.1704) (introducing the concept of
"ubijus ibi remedium," which means "where there is a right, there must be a remedy").
314. See Thomas R. Philips, The ConstitutionalRight to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1309, 1310 (2003) (noting that the right to a legal remedy for a wrong appears "expressly or
implicitly" with some variations, in forty state constitutions).
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and correcting wrongs. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that its state
constitution's "access to court" provision justifies the court in changing the
substantive content of traditional rules of common law causation so that a
tort plaintiff is able to recover." 5 However, most courts hold that the right to
a remedy is triggered only by a legal harm, requiring both (1) jurisdiction,
including all aspects of justiciability; and (2) proof of all elements of the
tort, including causation (often particularly difficult to prove in latent
diseases resulting from exposure to mass products).3"6
We expect too much from the common law judicialprocess when we ask
courts to afford compensation for all mass harms, or even all such harms
where defendants have acted tortiously. The Supreme Court itself proffered
an alternative. In Amchem,3"' the Court took the unusual step of suggesting
that Congress enact legislation: "The argument is sensibly made that a
nationwide administrative claims processing regime would provide the most
secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating victims of asbestos
exposure. ' In designing administrative compensation systems for victims
of mass torts, Congress would be constricted by neither the constitutionally
imposed bounded adjudication model nor the traditional requirement that a
victim prove that a particular tortfeasor caused her harm. Instead it could
establish statutory requirements for compensating victims and tax
manufacturers to finance the system. 319 However, Congress has repeatedly
voted down legislation adopting an administrative compensation system for
315. In Collins v. Eli Lilly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court took the unusual step of
construing its state constitutional provision in a manner that supported the loosening of the
common law causation requirements in a mass product tort case. 342 N.W.2d 47, 57 (Wis.
1984). However, in State v. Henley, the same court described its earlier actions under Article 1,
Section 9 of the state constitution in Thomas v. Mallet, 701 N.W.2d 523, 556 (Wis. 2005)
(following Collins) in creating a new remedy as "unwarranted" and "arbitrary and irrational."
787 N.W.2d 350, 367 n.29 (Wis. 2010).
316. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text. Even if a state court holds that
victims are entitled to a remedy for every tortiously caused harm, under the Supremacy Clause,
the Supreme Court's due process holdings flowing from the model of bounded adjudication
trump the state constitutional right. In federal court cases, even those applying state substantive
common law, the Article III justiciability requirements also prevent the federal court from
taking jurisdiction over such a case even if an applicable state constitutional provision suggests
that the harmed victim should be entitled to a remedy. Holdings based solely on federal
justiciability doctrines, however, obviously would not prevent the plaintiff from re-filing in state
court.
317. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
318. Id at 628-29.
319. See GIFFORD, supra note 28, at 221-23, 227-28 (discussing the feasibility of a
congressionally-imposed administrative compensation system); Robert Rabin, Some Thoughts
on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951,
955 (1993) (identifying "statutory constraints on possible catastrophic tort liability" as a socially
beneficial legislative response to mass tort compensation models).
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asbestos victims. 320 Today, trusts established by bankruptcy courts
compensate many victims of asbestos-related diseases.32 ' In their current
form, such trusts have been heavily criticized for their lack of transparency
that enables specious claimants to recover at the expense of both genuinely
harmed future claimants and solvent co-defendants.322 However, properly
structured and supervised by courts, such trusts would enable mass tort
victims to recover compensation without common law adjudication.
2.

A Response to Political Dysfunction

The second objective of the public law model of torts is to regulate when
Congress and administrative agencies have been "captured" by the interests
they regulate.323 Unfortunately, the performance of the politically
320. See Elise Gelinas, Comment, Asbestos FraudShould Lead to Fairness: Why Congress
Should Enact the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act, 69 MD. L. REV. 162, 168-72
(2009) (identifying several Congressional attempts to establish administrative compensation
systems for asbestosis claims).
321. See Georgene Vairo, Mass Torts Bankruptcies: The Who, The Why and The How, 78
AM. BANKR. L.J. 93, 113-14 (2004) (describing how bankruptcy courts channel asbestos claims
to settlement trusts).
322. E.g., The FurtheringAsbestos Claims TransparencyAct of 2012: Hearing Before the
H. Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. of Courts, Commercial & Admin. Law, 112th Cong. 3 (2012)
(written statement of S. Todd Brown, available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/
Hearings%202012/Brown%2005102012.pdf) (stating that "[e]arly trusts were flooded with
specious unimpaired claims .... We know that dubious claims continue to slip through the
cracks ...");Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class's Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The
Disconnect Between Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 76 (2003) (arguing that
bankruptcy trusts lack "distribution procedures that would enable the trusts to reject the
hundreds of thousands of meritless and specious claims").
323. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text; see also RENA STEINZOR & SIDNEY
SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE'S AGENTS AND THE BATTLE TO PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: SPECIAL
INTERESTS AND THREATS TO HEALTH, SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 42-44 (2010) (analyzing

the phenomenon of agency "capture"). Many scholars make the more limited claim that public
law tort litigation advances legislative and administrative reform, even if the courts themselves
sometimes lack the capacity to regulate. E.g., WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN,
DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS

295 (2004) (arguing that

"the penchant for rights-based litigation must be understood in relationship to the larger
institutional and cultural features of U.S. politics"); Timothy D. Lytton, Using Tort Litigation to
Enhance Regulatory Policy Making: EvaluatingClimate-Change Litigation in Light of Lessons
from Gun-Industry and Clergy-Sexual-Abuse Lawsuits, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1837, 1838 (2008)
(concluding that public tort litigation influences regulatory policy by "framing issues in terms of
institutional failure ... generating policy-relevant information; ... [and) placing issues on the
agendas of policy-making institutions"); Lynn Mather, Theorizing about Trial Courts: Lawyers,
Policymaking, and Tobacco Litigation, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 897, 908 (1998) (suggesting
that public interest litigation can serve as "the centerpiece of an overall political strategy");
Wendy E. Wagner, When All Else Fails:Regulating Risky Productsthrough Tort Litigation, 95
GEO. L.J. 693, 695 (2007) (concluding that public law torts "can be more effective than the
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accountable branches in regulating tobacco products324 and greenhouse gas
emissions,"' among other causes of mass harms, is disappointing. The
Supreme Court's recent decision striking down limits on corporate
campaign contributions will probably exacerbate the inability of Congress
to effectively regulate corporate interests.326
There are several responses to what might be called the "necessity
argument" in favor of unbounded mass tort litigation. First, Gerald
Rosenberg concludes in his classic study, The Hollow Hope. Can Courts
Bring About Social Change?,37 that traditional public interest litigation
emphasizing constitutional and statutory claims against government actors
is actually counterproductive to reformers' attempts to bring about social
change. He argues "that courts act as 'fly-paper' for social reformers who
succumb to the 'lure of litigation' ' 32' by deflecting reformers' energies from
substantive political battles offering genuine hope for reform to largely
symbolic judicial actions. It is extremely difficult to assess Rosenberg's
arguments in the context of public law torts. For example, the agreement
settling the litigation brought by state attorneys general against the tobacco
companies was largely denounced by public health experts. 329 However, it
established the nation's framework for regulating tobacco companies for
more than a decade until Congress enacted stronger regulation. In the
absence of the 1998 agreement, would Congress have been pressured to
enact stronger legislation earlier than 2009,330 or would other factors, such
as the then Republican, pro-business Congress (and, for most of the period,
the Presidency), have prevented such legislation? Obviously, similarly
difficult questions arise in the context of climate control.
A second response to the argument that the political branches are
dysfunctional is that Congress should have the freedom to preserve the
regulatory system in accessing the various types of information needed to inform regulatory
decisions").
324. See GIFFORD, supra note 28, at 104-12 (addressing the failure of the legislature and
administrative agencies to regulate tobacco products).
325. See Gifford, supra note 113, at 218 (reporting on the frustrations associated with
climate control policy in Congress and the EPA among those assisting in litigation).
326. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 882-85 (2010) (holding that
under the First Amendment, corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in candidate
elections cannot be limited).
327. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE?

(2d ed. 2008).

328. Id. at 427.
329. See GIFFORD, supra note 125, at 171-85 ("Following the announcement of the
settlement agreement, many public health advocates blasted it as a sweetheart deal for the
tobacco companies.").
330. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat.
1776 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 21 U.S.C.).

HeinOnline -- 44 Ariz. St. L.J. 1160 2012

44:1109]

CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDING

1161

status quo, without interference from the courts, by not acting until a
legislative consensus emerges."' This view assumes the legitimacy of
Congress' inactivity without questioning the fairness or effectiveness of the
reasoned, is
political process. The net result, as Duncan Kennedy once
332
legislature.
the
to
than
rather
power,
private
to
"deference
The final response to the necessity argument is that the principles
supporting the model of bounded adjudication other than judicial
competence-namely, arguments based on (1) participation as justification
for adjudication and (2) separation of powers-simply trump the necessity
argument.33 3 When tortiously caused mass harms of any sort are involved, it
is tempting to bend constitutional principles that are often not self-defining
and to accept, without question, the authority of any government actors,
including judges, who offer the promise of compensating victims or
regulating harmful conduct. Weighing such immediately recognizable
benefits against long term damage to either the constitutional structure or
the legitimacy of adjudication is not impossible, but it must be done with
care. In the Conclusion,33 4 I explore this tricky balancing process.

CONCLUSION

Each of the factors described in Part III is important, but none by itself is
decisive. Certainly, considered together, they leave room for disagreement
among reasonable people. Defining the limits of judicial competence and
the appropriate role of adjudication in a constitutional democracy helps to
structure the analysis, but it does not answer the ultimate questions. When
application of these factors point in opposite directions, as they frequently
do in assessing particular examples of cutting-edge mass tort litigation, both
trial courts and the Supreme Court are left to a balancing test.
Chayes clearly recognized the tension between his public law model and
the appropriate limits of adjudication in a constitutional structure when he
admitted that he was willing to accept "a good deal of disorderly, pragmatic
institutional overlap"3'35 between the courts and the political branches when
331. Steams, supra note 210, at 1319 (contrasting Congress's "institutional power of
inertia" with the courts' "obligat[ion] to decide cases properly before [it]").
332. Kennedy, supra note 71, at 1761.
333. Cf Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and Economics: Integrating Moral
Constraints with Economic Analysis of Law, 96 CAL. L. REv. 323, 326 (2008) (stating that
"prevailing deontological theories are moderate rather than absolutist . . . [and] may be

overridden for the sake of furthering good outcomes or avoiding bad ones if enough good (or
bad) is at stake").
334. See infra notes 335-44 and accompanying text.
335. Chayes, supra note 53, at 1313.
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the only alternative was the imperfect functioning of Congress and
administrative agencies. Perhaps more surprising was the fact that Henry
Hart, Lon Fuller's colleague and an early admirer of his model of bounded
adjudication, reportedly shared Chayes's sentiments.336 Eskridge and
Frickey recount a story about Hart that occurred during one session of his
Federal Courts course in the midst of the often politically and legally
fractious 1960s. Hart began teaching an opinion in which the Supreme
Court used the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to abate state prosecutions of civil
rights protesters.337 He laid out the facts and relevant statutory framework,
setting the stage for what promised to be a blistering legal process critique
of the Court's holding and reasoning. However, Hart suddenly stopped and
paused for a full thirty seconds before continuing, "Sometimes, sometimes,
'
you just have to do the right thing."338
To me, this story resonates with the current global climate change
situation where Congress and the EPA appear unable or unwilling to
prevent widespread, serious harm. I would be willing to bend the
deontological principles underlying a model of unbounded adjudication to
achieve a solution to global climate change, but one obstacle remains. I am
convinced that courts lack the institutional capacity to solve the problem
and would likely either offer false hope to those concerned about climate
change or worse, would make a mess of the ecological system, the
economy, or both. Trial courts lack the competence to hear the facts and
arguments of all affected individuals and to resolve the infinitely
polycentric issues involved in determining whether any particular
greenhouse gas emitter's contributions to global warming are unreasonable
and whether abatement is warranted. Accordingly, though I might be
willing to trade a solution to global climate change for a modest bending of
the principles of separation of powers and the legitimacy of adjudication, I
am unwilling to compromise these principles in exchange for a grant of
authority to the courts when their efforts to abate global climate change are
likely doomed to failure. If the solution to a transcendent social or
ecological issue of a massive scale, such as segregation or global climate
change, reasonably appears to lie within the capabilities of a common law
court, like Professor Hart, I would make the Faustian bargain.
However, just because the Supreme Court's (and Fuller's) implicit model
of bounded adjudication does not answer all questions, does not mean that it
is without value. A more openly acknowledged and explicitly stated model
336. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 63, at cxiii.
337. Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
338. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 63, at cxiii (quoting David Chambers's recollection of
Hart's comments).
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of bounded adjudication, serving as a presumptive model or set of
guidelines, would force judges, who may primarily see themselves as
government actors solving social problems, to focus on the limits of their
appropriate function within a democracy. The model of bounded
adjudication could help them appreciate that their powers flow from
principled and restrained methods of adjudication and, ultimately, the
public's respect for these processes. However, in the end, if a court is
otherwise capable of resolving an intractable, mass social or ecological
problem, the democracy-enhancing objectives of the model of bounded
adjudication should not serve as a straightjacket.
Beyond these rare examples of litigation focused on uniquely threatening
and transcendent problems, such as civil rights and climate change
litigation, courts should be genuinely deferential to the model of bounded
adjudication. When the Court decided Amchem, it wisely called upon
Congress to establish an administrative compensation system.33 9 A
stalemated Congress failed to act, but other governmental bodies-in
particular, the bankruptcy courts-assumed the task.34 Soon after the
Supreme Court reversed the punitive damages award in Williams, which
was the result of an unbounded process, Congress strengthened tobacco
regulation and the Oregon state courts even found a way to preserve the
jury's original damage awards.341 The public law tort advocates did not win
the dramatic, highly publicized judicial victories that would have resembled
the major constitutional law cases of an earlier era, but the governance
structure as a whole stumbled forward, compensating victims and regulating
conduct.
At the same time, the Supreme Court's implicit constitutional adoption
of the model of bounded adjudication should not be blamed for failing to
save us from the inadequacies of a dysfunctional political system. Our
frustrations should be focused instead on Congress and administrative
agencies, such as the EPA. This is not the Supreme Court of the New Deal.
The Court is declaring neither the FDA's regulation of cigarettes nor the
EPA's regulation of greenhouse gas emissions to be unconstitutional.

339. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997) (suggesting that Congress
should consider the "sensibly made" argument that "a nationwide administrative claims
processing regime" be established).
340. See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
341. Williams v. Philip Morris USA, 176 P.3d 1255, 1263 (Or. 2008) (finding no error in
the trial court's jury instruction, as challenged by the defendant, and reinstating the jury's
punitive damages award), cert. granted, 553 U.S. 1093 (2008), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 556 U.S. 178 (2009).
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Today, attorneys general of the federal342 and state governments 343
sometimes file public law model, common law, or statutory tort actions
against corporate tortfeasors after their own colleagues in stalemated
legislatures and captured administrative agencies fail to enact effective
regulation or to otherwise legislatively solve public health problems. These
public officials and other public interest advocates should pause long
enough to refresh their memories of Shakespeare's Julius Caesar,
paraphrase its language, and apply it to their current situation: "The fault..
is not in [the Court], [b]ut in ourselves ....

342. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
(dismissing most of the federal government's claims for injunctive relief under Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968) cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
3502 (2010).
343. State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 435 (R.I. 2008) (reversing the judgment for
the state, acting as parens patriae, in an action against former lead pigment manufacturers);
Complaint, Moore ex rel. State v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429 (Miss. Ch. Ct. May 23, 1994)
(filing a complaint on behalf of the state of Mississippi against thirteen tobacco companies),
availableat http://www.library.ucsf.edu/sites/all/files/ucsfassets/ms complaint.pdf.
344. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 1, sc. 2, 16 (Filiquarian Publishing 2007)
("The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, [b]ut in ourselves, that we are underlings.")
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